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The overabundance of data created by modern information systems (IS) has led to a 
breakdown in cognitive decision-making. Without authoritative source data, 
commanders’ decision-making processes are hindered as they attempt to paint an 
accurate shared operational picture (SOP). Further impeding the decision-making process 
is the lack of proper interface interaction to provide a visualization that aids in the 
extraction of the most relevant and accurate data. 
Utilizing the DSS to present visualizations based on OLAP cube integrated data 
allow decision-makers to rapidly glean information and build their situation awareness 
(SA). This yields a competitive advantage to the organization while in garrison or in 
combat. Additionally, OLAP cube data integration enables analysis to be performed on 
an organization’s data-flows. This analysis is used to identify the critical path of data 
throughout the organization. Linking a decision-maker to the authoritative data along this 
critical path eliminates the many decision layers in a hierarchal command structure that 
can introduce latency or error into the decision-making process. Furthermore, the 
organization has an integrated SOP from which to rapidly build SA, and make effective 
and efficient decisions. 
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The overabundance of data created by modern information systems (IS) has led to 
a breakdown in cognitive decision making. Without authoritative source data, a 
commander’s decision-making process is hindered as they attempt to paint an accurate 
shared operational picture (SOP) for their organization. Further impeding the decision-
making process is the lack of proper interface interaction to provide a visualization that 
aids in the extraction of relevant data from the mass of unusable data (Keim, Mansmann, 
Schneidewind, & Ziegler, 2006, p. 1). In the United States Marine Corps (USMC), the 
communication breakdown between the Command and Control: Information, 
Surveillance, Reconnaissance (C2ISR) system and the Global Combat Support System-
Marine Corps (GCCS-MC) impedes the decision-maker from perceiving an accurate 
SOP. As a result, the commander is not provided the most accurate data on which to base 
his or her decision. By providing the decision-maker with a decision support system 
(DSS) that utilizes visualization tools to present accurate and relevant data returns from 
an integrated knowledge base (KB), all echelons of operational and strategic decision-
makers can achieve a SOP. With this SOP, organizational decision-makers can more 
efficiently and effectively advance through their decision-making processes. 
A. PROBLEM AND PURPOSE STATEMENT 
The decision-maker’s cognitive capacity often limits the amount of data that they 
can assimilate before situation awareness (SA) deteriorates. With the aid of a DSS, data 
streams may be scalable to better meet the needs of the decision-maker. The automated 
processing of optimized interface visualizations with allocation recommendations will 
depict a real-time SOP throughout the organization.  This SOP will reduce the latency 
and possible error injection points that exist in the current hierarchal command structure 
of USMC organizations. 
The lack of data integration creates a saturated data pool that is unorganized, 
irrelevant, and redundant (Moody & Walsh, 1999). A visual interface that extracts 
relevant data from the mass of unusable data will help commanders quickly orient 
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themselves to the situation and build a more accurate SOP (Keim, Mansmann, 
Schneidewind, & Ziegler, 2006). Furthermore, customizable queries will allow the user 
to display real-time data, integrated across applicable data sources, allowing for a 
scalable interface that meets the user’s decision-making data requirements. According to 
Keen and Scott-Morton (1978), “the information system should be tailored to the 
information processing style of the individual user” (as cited in Sobol & Klein, 1989, p. 
893). With rapid access to relevant and required data, the commander will be able to 
build a more accurate and reliable SOP that limits data saturation. The automated 
processing of optimized interface visualizations, with allocation recommendations, will 
transform the current hierarchal command structure decision making process from one 
that is reactive, to on that is predictive, and ultimately prescriptive.  This transformation 
will yield an organizational competitive advantage both in garrison and in combat. 
The purpose of this qualitative study is to develop the appropriate content from 
both the C2ISR and GCSS-MC data streams to allow the Marine Air Ground Task Force 
(MAGTF) commander and staff to make effective decisions based off the single 
incorporated data stream without outside resources. This research was conducted for 
Logistics Vision & Strategy Branch Headquarters, Marine Corps (HQMC) for 
incorporation into the C2ISR and GCSS-MC information technology (IT) solution. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis seeks to answer the following questions: 
1. What is the most efficient method to display real-time information from 
the operations, intelligence, and logistics online analytical processing 
(OLAP) cube database, in order to provide an accurate SOP to the 
decision-maker? 
2. What is the relevant information from the OLAP cube database that is 






The initial research method approach used was a case study or review into the 
current tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) of commanders regarding C2ISR and 
GCSS-MC. Selected observations and documentation from Marine Corps Center for 
Lessons Learned (MCCLL), debriefs, and after-action reports provide the baseline cases 
to retrieve the research data. The data analysis is grouped by themes for interpretation 
and correlation. A grounded theory research approach determines the data stream 
similarities between C2ISR and GCSS-MC. These similarities are important in the 
determination of optimization potential for GCSS-MC as a standalone analytical tool. 
This combined filtered data is the conduit for developing the interface dashboard utilizing 
a systems engineering approach. Based on operational expertise with no imposed 
constraints, the researcher developed a task sequence flow that shows what data should 
flow through the two incorporated systems—C2ISR and GCSS-MC—to the MEU 
Commander. This involved several trips to interact with C2ISR and GCSS-MC sponsors. 
Secondary research provided the data and researchers consolidated it thematically 
from lessons learned materials. These data sets were analyzed by incorporating a ranking 
system to determine what data and information the commanders determined most useful, 
relevant, and important at each level of the command and staff structure. Then the best 
information practices were incorporated into a proposed solution to the data requirements 
necessary in the integration of the operational, intelligence, and logistics data streams for 
future commanders. 
D. POTENTIAL BENEFITS AND LIMITATIONS 
The potential benefit of this thesis study is the discovery of an enhanced data 
stream of information to the commander and staff. The data stream would contain the 
optimized portions of intelligence, operational, and logistics information available to the 
commander and staff via USMC database resources within the Department of Defense 
(DOD) architecture. When utilized in conjunction with available C2ISR and GCSS-MC 
data streams, database queries may enhance the combat capability of the force stemming 
from improvements in logistic agility. Further budgetary constraints within the DOD 
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necessitate these cost-saving strategies of supply postures. Research was limited to 
functional assessments, but does not include OLAP design or data integration algorithms. 
Continued research developing the optimized COTS OLAP, which combines the C2ISR 
data stream with the GCSS-MC data stream in order to achieve the desired outputs 
developed in this research, will be necessary. In addition, assessing the collaborative 
planning capability enabled by suggested COTS OLAP decision support tools that 
integrate operations, logistics, and intelligence data is recommended. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. USMC DOCTRINE 
The conduct of warfare is as much an art form as it is a scientific process. The 
science comes into play as inputs create outputs and internal and external forces create 
reactions to situations. The artistic realm employs creativity during unique situations in 
order to devise practical solutions. The United States Marine Corps (USMC) relies upon 
doctrine to drive the scientific process, or tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). The 
doctrine does not dictate rules, but instead creates a fabric of knowledge from which a 
commander can deviate based upon the warfighting tools available. According to General 
A. M. Gray, 29th Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC), the fundamental nature of 
warfare is fluid and the means and methods used in implementation evolve (USMC, 
1997a). General Gray warned that without constant improvement of our profession, the 
Marine Corps risks becoming “outdated, stagnant, and defeated” (USMC, 1997a, p. 6). 
General C. C. Krulak continued this acknowledgement of the evolutionary nature of 
warfare stating, “doctrine must continue to evolve based on growing experience, 
advancements in theory, and the changing face of war itself” (USMC, 1997a, p. 2). The 
drastic changes in warfare throughout history have resulted from disruptive technologies 
that ultimately upset the equilibrium in war, such as the rifled bore, railroad, wireless 
communication, and information technology. 
1. USMC Warfighting Philosophy 
War is a violent clash of wills between organized groups, characterized by the use 
of military force, including both state and non-state actors (USMC, 1997a). War’s 
essence is a “violent struggle between independent, irreconcilable wills, each trying to 
impose itself on the other” (USMC, 1997a, p. 3). The very nature of the conflict of 
opposing human wills, demonstrates the inherently interactive social process that makes 
up warfare. Despite the simplistic appearance of warfare, the conduct is extremely 
difficult due to countless factors, which when combined, manifest into the theory of 
friction. According to MCDP 1 (1997a), “friction is the force that resists all action and 
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saps energy. It makes the simple difficult and the difficult seemingly impossible” (p. 14). 
Friction could be a result of indecisiveness and therefore mental in nature. Often self-
induced, friction can be caused by numerous factors including lack of coordination, 
complex task organizations or command relationships, or complicated technologies. 
According to Clausewitz (1968), “Everything in war is simple, but the simplest thing is 
difficult. The difficulties accumulate and end by producing a kind of friction that is 
inconceivable unless one has experienced war” (p. 119). 
Other significant attributes of war include uncertainty, fluidity, disorder, and 
complexity. Uncertainty, or the fog of war according to Clausewitz (1968), is the 
unknowns about the enemy, environment, and the friendly situation. Clausewitz (1968) 
continues that based on this uncertainty, all actions in warfare are founded on incomplete, 
inaccurate, and contradictory information. Based on the fluidity of war, the conduct of 
such actions requires flexibility of thought and no episode during the preparation or 
conduct of war can be viewed in isolation (Clausewitz, 1968). According to Clausewitz 
(1968), some portions of warfare will be dictated by periods of organized chaos and 
intense combat, while other periods may be saner, limited to information gathering alone. 
Disorder follows extreme occurrences of uncertainty, fluidity, and friction, which leads to 
instructions and information becoming unclear and misinterpreted, ultimately resulting in 
complete communication failure (Clausewitz, 1968). 
MCDP 6 describes belligerents as a complex system of numerous individual parts, 
vice a singular opposing will, which the intricacy of warfare breaks down (USMC, 1996). 
However, according to MCDP 6, it is not the number of parts that makes a system 
complex, but instead the interactions of those parts (USMC, 1996). MCDP 6 also 
explains that military action is a complex system by nature and will exhibit unpredictable, 
chaotic behaviors that defy precise control. The unique, unpredictable nature of warfare 
composed of moral, mental, and physical forces drives situations that cannot isolate 
individual cause and effect, but instead are fundamentally characterized by their human 
nature (USMC, 1997a). 
Operational objectives in warfare are achieved through military force in two 
general ways: annihilation and erosion. According to MCDP 1 (1997a), the strategy of 
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annihilation embodies the temporary or permanent elimination of the belligerent as a 
viable military threat. Erosion, by contrast, convinces the enemy that accepting terms is 
beneficial to their personal interest vice the continuation of hostilities (USMC, 1997a). 
Military force is the deadliest element of national power at the discretion of the military 
decision-makers, but must be considered in concert with the other elements of military 
force: diplomatic, informational, and economical. MCDP 1 (1997a) defines the spectrum 
of conflict as an atmosphere spanning non-war military operations to general warfare. 
The military involvement and use of force required throughout this spectrum is broad, 
based on factors including overarching policy objectives, available military means, 
national will, and density of combat power (USMC, 1997a). In addition, there are three 
distinct hierarchical levels of war, interrelated with operations conducted within each 
layer simultaneously. These include: strategic, focusing on policy objectives; tactical, 
focusing on the application of combat power at a specific place and time; and operational, 
focusing between the two, using tactical results to attain strategic objectives (USMC, 
1997a). 
Different styles of warfare exist within the spectrum of conflict residing between 
annihilation and erosion. The U.S. Marine Corps (1997a) describes attrition as a direct 
test of strength; described as “the cumulative destruction of the enemy’s material assets 
by superior firepower” (p. 36). In contrast to attrition is maneuver warfare, the principle 
focus of Marine Corps warfare doctrine, which circumvents problems and attacks from 
an advantageous position vice attacking the strength. Generally enemy concentrations are 
avoided and friendly strengths are used against enemy weaknesses to maximize 
advantages. This style relies heavily on identifying and exploiting enemy weaknesses and 
acting with tempo, using firepower and attrition to eliminate the enemy’s center of 
gravity incapacitating them systematically. 
Two concepts, both significant contributors to combat power and heavily 
dependent on information flow, are speed and focus. Speed consistent over time is tempo, 
which allows decision-makers to seize the initiative and dictate terms during combat. 
MCDP 1 (1997a) states that combat focus converges the effects of the coordinated efforts 
of ground combat, aviation, and combat service support elements in time and space on 
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the objective for the accomplishment of mission goals. Implementation of the right 
amount of speed and focus achieves surprise derived from deception, ambiguity, and 
stealth. Strong situation awareness, founded from cognitive knowledge, leads to the 
exploitation of surprise based on bold action according to doctrine (USMC, 1997a). 
Endsley (1995) stated “situation awareness is the perception of the elements in the 
dynamic environment within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their 
meaning, and the projection of their status in the near future” (p. 36). In the case of the 
commander fulfilling a command and control function, situation awareness is dependent 
upon their ability to draw an accurate representation of the dynamic environment based 
on their interaction with the computer-based decision support system (DSS). The rapid 
and accurate building of situation awareness will aid the commander proceed through 
their decision-making process. 
The decision-maker’s situation awareness (SA) is derived from his or her 
interaction with the computer-based DSS, as depicted in the world models of DSS; Figure 
1. This interaction drives a higher degree of situation awareness as it shapes the cognitive 
world model (CWM) of the decision-maker. The CWM is shaped as the decision-maker 
queries the DSS with information requests. These queries retrieve information from the 
digital world model (DWM), which is the correlated data from the sensors. Sensors are 
collecting data from the dynamic environment that makes up the physical world model 
(PWM). By minimizing the gaps between the CWM, DWM, and PWM, the user will 
have a more accurate shared operational picture (SOP). In order to minimize these gaps, 
there exists a requirement for a cognitive assistant to aid the decision-maker through 
predictive and prescriptive analysis of the DWM.
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Figure 1.  The World Models of the DSS
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The dynamic relationships among the physical, moral, and mental components of 
an enemy are complex, and define the unique character of a belligerent force. 
Understanding which factors are critical and incapacitating to the enemy is important in 
order to define the center of gravity of the competing forces. In combination with 
understanding where the enemy is most vulnerable to attack, Commander’s efforts should 
be focused toward affecting the aspects that are most impactful, the critical vulnerability, 
leading to the collapse of the belligerent force. Hans von Seeckt is quoted in MCDP 1 
(1997a) “Intellect without will is worthless, will without intellect is dangerous” (p. 51). 
2. The Role of Information  
Marine Corps forces are task organized, adaptable units tailored for operations 
during a wartime environment consisting of the appropriate ground combat, aviation, 
support, and command element. The tasked organized units are built around the premise 
of the MAGTF. The MAGTF is a scalable and malleable in size and structure based upon 
the situation or crisis. The MAGTF is equipped with technology that is easily 
maintainable, reliable, and interoperable allowing for operation in undeveloped 
environments with minimal supporting infrastructure. “The overreliance on technology 
and the failure to make the most of technology capabilities” (p. 67) are two inherent 
dangers of newer equipment within the Marine Corps (USMC, 1997a). Information 
systems (IS) enhance warfighting by improving the commander’s ability to wage war. 
Technology is a component of, not a substitution for, the commanders’ decision-making 
process. IS are exposed in austere environments and commanders’ dependencies on them 
create unacceptable vulnerabilities negated by the instructive commander’s intent for 
operations. Advancements in technology are focused on making structured (static, rigid) 
TTPs into semi-structured TTPs that are adaptable to a dynamic environment. Instead, IS 
helps the different operational tiers within a unit function more efficiently by inducing 
greater data-to-decision capacity. 
Information systems need to integrate within the Marine Corps command 
philosophy to achieve benefits and must drive the commander’s actions based upon 
taking the initiative or reacting to the opponent (USMC, 2001). During the conduct of 
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war, command and control is decentralized; subordinate commanders making decisions 
based on the intent of the senior commander. Information systems, combined with proper 
procedures, enhance command and control abilities and ideally support big data veracity, 
but must not detract or disallow from the human on-the-loop decision-making ability. 
Marine Corps commanders will place themselves in a physical or virtual position to 
influence combat, enabling observation of action directly and indirectly. For example, 
filtered unmanned aerial system (UAS) footage provides indirect observation, and 
circumvents delays and inaccuracies of information passage providing the decision-
maker with a recognized information source. The C2 system should support the dictated 
veracity of the commander, allowing for updating of courses of action and ranked 
priorities. 
The essential element of the conduct of warfare is decision-making at the 
appropriate level, and time is often the critical factor for effectiveness. Whichever 
commander makes and implements decisions quickest gains the decisive advantage 
during dynamic situations. Speed, however, is not as important during deliberate planning 
situations. At higher levels of command, decision-making is an analytical process based 
on a comparison of the information and the courses of action available. According to the 
Marine Corps (USMC, 1997a), the essence of the problems inherent with decision-
making is selecting the best course of action with an acceptable level of risk quicker than 
your opponent. As stated in General George Patton’s published memoirs (1979), “a good 
plan violently executed now is better than a perfect plan executed next week” (p. 354). 
3. Commander’s Critical Information Requirements 
The commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs) are bits of 
information necessary for timely decision-making appropriate to the position within the 
spectrum of conflict (Joint Staff, 2011). This information identifies friendly and enemy 
activities as well as the environment deriving knowledge from data provided via the 
operational, intelligence, and logistics COP. It is imperative that CCIRs link to critical 
decisions the commander anticipates making, not to higher headquarters significant 
notification events, thereby focusing the staff and other collection efforts. CCIRs tailor 
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the command and control organization of a unit and are essential for information 
management (USMC, 2001). 
The Marine Corps planning process generates information requirements, which 
inform the process, or become assumptions for continued planning and result in CCIRs. 
During execution, beneficial CCIRs are linked to decision points for the commander 
(USMC, 2001). The two categories of CCIRs are: priority intelligence requirements 
derived from the information stream of the intelligence COP and friendly force 
information requirements derived from the operational and logistical COP. These 
requirements are necessary for the commander to assimilate holistically in order to make 
effective decisions. 
Clearance and access levels create difficulties for source classification of data, but 
can be addressed using proven methodologies for protecting shared data objects. Data 
sources must incorporate data coloring into the information transmitted or stored. 
According to Hwang and Li (2010), data coloring is a viable technique for safeguarding 
multi-way authentications and controlling access for sensitive data. Within the private 
cloud architecture of the Department of Defense (DOD) data coloring can be applied to 
protect databases, images, video, software, and documents at varying security levels 
based on necessity. Only legitimate users have access to restricted data based on the level 
of security of the data storage combined with data coloring. Hwang and Li (2010) 
contend that the computational complexity of this type of encryption is much lower than 
conventional encryption and decryption techniques, such as PKI, inducing very low 
overhead to the DOD. 
MAGTF commanders, geographically removed from the direct combat 
environment, observe the operation vicariously via three basic methods: battle rhythm, 
collection plan, and combat reporting feedback. All three methods provide critical 
information to the commander through distinctive interactions of the commander, the 
staff, higher, subordinate, and adjacent units. In the dynamic environment of warfare 
information overload is a potential threat mitigated by sound information management 
principles ensuring rapid, distributed, and unconstrained flow between units at every 
level. The policies and procedures emplaced by the commander’s information 
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management practices enables the staff or IS to prevent information overload by 
discerning important, timely information from analyzed data in a focused manner 
directed toward a decision point. 
B. COMMAND AND CONTROL 
Information systems change the very nature of command and control (C2) 
(Alberts & Hayes, 2003). Information systems geographically displace the commander 
from the tactical edge of the battlespace. Clausewitz (1968) refutes the impact of 
information systems on the C2 process stating commanders work in mediums that are not 
visible. As warfare tactics and strategies have evolved with technological advances, the 
command and control node has been displaced further from the tactical edge (Van 
Creveld, 1985). Despite being geographically displaced from the front lines, the 
commander’s necessity for objective, accurate, and timely battlefield information is 
paramount to attaining battlefield certainty (Griffin, 1991). 
The Marine Corps’ view of command and control, based upon doctrine that lags 
behind technological advances, expresses that doctrine is separate from a particular 
technology (USMC, 1996). C2 functionality is the fundamental requirement of any IS 
within the Marine Corps decision-making process for growth, survival, and success. C2 is 
not a specialized function within the Marine Corps, but instead the thread linking all 
functions and operations into the system to achieve an objective effectively measured in 
relation to the enemy. An effective C2 system will mitigate the effects of informational 
fog of war, and allow the decision-makers to rapidly orient themselves to the situation. 
Furthermore, as stated by Alberts and Hayes (2003), the C2 system will have the 
endurance to constantly monitor and evaluate the changing battlespace. Galster (2007) 
contends that future C2 will rely on sophisticated technologies for facilitating a complete 
situation awareness within the SOP. Effective C2 increases the commander’s common 
operational picture and reveals decision points and appropriate actions that aid in 
achieving the commander’s intent by utilizing standard operating procedures. 
A dynamic view of Command and Control described by the USMC (1996) 
suggested that command is the exercise of authority and control is the feedback process 
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relaying the effects of action back into the C2 infrastructure. Coakley (1992) described 
C2 as a process as well as the arrangement of the organizational structure, equipment, and 
procedures. Similarly, NDP-6 (1996) defined C2 as both a process “planning, directing, 
coordinating, and controlling of forces and operations” (p. 6) and system “personnel, 
equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by the commander” (p. 
6); in which the commander operates in both. Commanders decide what needs to be done 
and direct the conduct of subordinates while control is the continuous flow of current 
information back into the system allowing the commander to modify command action as 
necessary. Thus, C2 is an interactive process with mutually supporting systems to ensure 
the system adapts to environmental changes. 
There are several important features to consider when considering C2 as a 
complex system of action and feedback loops (USMC, 1996). C2 is inherently an open 
system interacting with other systems freely, and must be sensitive to changes in the 
situation and adapt accordingly. Second, C2 is not a sequence of discrete events, but a 
continuous process as demonstrated by the action-feedback loop. The action-feedback 
loop also styles C2 as an interactive process requiring cooperation during dynamic 
environments to connect all elements together cohesively. The commander must also be 
an integral part of the system, not an outside influence to the C2 system. Lastly, C2 as 
modeled cannot provide precision, predictability, or autonomous order to the chaos of 
warfare. The human element cannot be entirely eliminated and should be redrawn from 
inclusion into the Human System Interface (HSI) workflows. Instead leverage the 
human’s cognitive superiority over systems by driving the systems’ workflow to generate 
meaningful knowledge. Additionally, this provides human validation of the systems’ 
predictive and prescriptive alternatives. 
Command and Control is made up of three basic elements: people, information, 
and the support structure (USMC, 1996). Concentration tends to focus on the information 
requirements and equipment interactions of commanders, but effective C2 involves 
qualified people applying a guiding philosophy in the use of appropriate systems. People 
collaborate with one another implicitly by using shared data structures for operational 
purposes to gather information, make decisions, and take action. This requirement creates 
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the fertile ground to imbed Artificial Intelligence (AI) technologies into C2 as it adds to 
the automation of collaborative decision-making. The second element of C2 is 
information, which gives structure and shapes the surrounding beliefs, informing the 
decision-maker. Valuable information, often described in terms of uncertainty, 
timeliness, accuracy, and context, provides two distinct, but not mutually exclusive 
vantage points. These two vantage points are maintaining situation awareness and the 
directing of the executed course of action. Though distinct, maintaining situation 
awareness should be continuously occurring. 
The support structure is the final element of C2, aiding in the creation, 
dissemination, and use of information. An important distinction is that the support 
structure is not solely equipment, but also the organizations, procedures, facilities, 
training, education, and doctrine. Ultimately, the goal of C2 is to maintain the situation 
awareness for the commander in order to implement decisions. These decisions are 
chosen based on the best course of action and direct the coordination of further actions. 
The execution and direction must occur while simultaneously coping with the 
fundamental challenge of uncertainty, timeliness, accuracy, and contextual relevance of 
information. 
Coakley (1992) characterizes the information age by rapid, ongoing changes and 
incremental developments, particularly in the realm of technology. Coakley (1992) 
describes the technology of the information age as having produced spectacular increases 
in data available as well as the speed with which it can be delivered leading to 
overwhelming commanders. The technological improvements in individual mobility, 
communication range, weapon lethality, and information-gathering techniques compress 
time and space on the battlefield and increase the demand for just in time information. 
Rapidly developing situations necessitate continuously updated information to combat 
ineffectiveness of the C2 system. However, even with the realized advancements of 
information systems, it is important to dispel the notion that a specific technology can 
replace the human role in the decision support engine. 
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1. Derivations of Boyd’s Observe-Orient-Decide-Act Loop 
The fundamental theory for the command and control process begins with the 
basic observe-orient-decide-act (OODA) loop model, which describes the C2 sequence 
for a two-sided conflict. Figure 2 depicts Boyd’s expanded sketch of the OODA loop as 




Figure 2.  Boyd’s OODA Loop (from Boyd, 1996)
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The four phases of the OODA loop begin with observing the situation as it 
pertains to an individual’s status, their enemies, and surroundings; and molding it into an 
understanding of the implicit guidance from higher. During the orientation phase, 
commanders create a coherent understanding of the situation utilizing estimations, 
assumptions, analysis, and cultural norms. This understanding is passed on to 
subordinates as guidance, from which subordinate commanders can base their decisions 
upon. Most importantly is the feedback process, which is continuously imposed from the 
decision and action phases as well as the changes within the environment as the enemy 
reacts of their own will. The prominent element of the OODA loop is creating tempo in 
the process, increasing decision-making speed relative to the enemy, and gaining the 
competitive advantage by forcing the enemy to continuously react to the situation. This 
theory is echoed in naval doctrine: 
Information fuels the command and control process…the naval 
commander must gather and use information better and faster than his 
adversary…A commander who makes and implements sound decisions 
faster than his adversary, increases the relative tempo of operations and 
leverages his capabilities in maneuver and firepower. (Naval Doctrinal 
Publication [NDP] 6, 1996, p. 4) 
2. Data, Information, Knowledge, Understanding, Wisdom Hierarchy 
The lowest classification in the data, information, knowledge, understanding, 
wisdom (DIKUW) hierarchy is data. According to Chen et al., (2014) data is the 
“uninterrupted raw quantities, characters, or symbols collected, stored, and transmitted” 
(p. 42). In the context of military use, data is the raw bits of unprocessed signals that have 
not been evaluated or interpreted. 
The output of data into the information system is information (Batra, 2014, p. 6). 
Information is the next level of data classification according to the DIKUW model. Chen 
et al. (2014) state, “information is a collection of interpreted, structured, or organized 
data that’s meaningful and useful for certain applications” (p. 42). As information is 
analyzed and integrated to gauge relevance, utilizing some form of cognition, the product 
is knowledge. 
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The next level of the DIKUW hierarchy is knowledge. According to Chen et al. 
(2014), “knowledge is acquaintance or familiarity about facts, truths, or principles gained 
through study or investigation” (p. 42). The foundation of statistical inference is that 
knowledge always increases with incremental information, but due to the concept of rare 
events, this theory is not true in all cases (Taleb, 2005). According to Lowenthal (2003), 
translating information to knowledge can be categorized as analysis; which is not limited 
to “sifting through accumulated data…but seeing the mass of material in its entirety and 
being able to perceive patterns from day-to-day anomalous reports” (p. 90). Deriving 
knowledge from anomalous reports is of great importance to the intelligence analyst; 
however, the operational commander values a predictive or prescriptive model to perform 
C2 (operations, logistics, METOC) analysis. The goal of any analytical information 
system is providing the best solution based on the veracity, quality, and timeliness of 
data. 
Understanding follows knowledge in the DIKUW hierarchy. Understanding is the 
data cognitive process that is a result of synthesis or visualization, while gaining situation 
awareness. Understanding is the decision-maker’s application of their cognitive world 
model applied to the dynamic environment. This application attempts to identify and 
attempt to resolve areas of uncertainty. 
The highest classification of the DIKUW hierarchy is wisdom. Though 
omnipotent certainty will never be achieved, information utility can be attained through 
limiting uncertainty (Taylor, 1965). According to Chen et al. (2014), “wisdom is 
sagacity, discernment, or insight to know what’s true or right for making correct 
judgments, decisions, and actions” (p. 42). Furthermore, Batra (2014) states “wisdom is 
cumulative knowledge tempered by experience” (p. 6). Therefore, in order for the 
progression of data to become wisdom, the decision-maker needs to utilize their 
understanding in an interaction with the dynamic environment. This interaction, or 
resultant experience, fosters wisdom. 
Information is a generically used term to describe data at all levels in the DIKUW 
hierarchy. However, the value of the source data is in the utility that it provides as it is 
translated to organizational wisdom. Batra (2014) states, “Data itself becomes a key 
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resource for an enterprise, and deliberate opportunities are created to generate data at 
innumerable data points to create value, thereby providing competitive advantage to an 
enterprise” (p. 1). Therefore, the utility of data in the command and control node is in the 
value that it adds to building an accurate SOP, which is the foundation for achieving a 
high quality of decisions. 
The modern battlefield is a myriad of data collection sensors. As data is collected 
analysis needs to be conducted in order to filter and process relevant data to higher levels 
of the hierarchy. This type of analysis is what Lowenthal (2003) argues is the “wheat 
versus chaff problem” (p. 90) and minimizing the uncertainty in order to improve 
cognitive perception. Furthermore, Saracevic (1999) states that relevance can be defined 
as either cognitive or situational relevance. Cognitive relevance is the “relation between 
the current state of knowledge and cognitive information needs of a user” (Saracevic, 
1999, p. 1059). The goal of cognitive relevance is to minimize the gap between the 
decision-maker’s current situation awareness and the contextual representation of the 
dynamic environment in the digital world model. Situational relevance is “the relation 
between the information objects retrieved by the information systems and the situations 
the information objects are in” (Saracevic, 1999, p. 1059). 
Information systems and technology are fully capable of gathering and processing 
raw data into information, however, in order to translate data into higher levels of the 
DIKUW framework, human interaction and experience is required. The cognition 
required to obtain knowledge is a human characteristic and transforming complex 
components of knowledge into situation awareness via intuition and judgment is a human 
trait based on experience. The transformation of raw data to higher levels of the DIKUW 
hierarchy is a product of the data integration, data fusion, and experience that occurs 
between each level of the hierarchy. Data integration is necessary to elevate data to 
information, while data fusion is driving the transformation of information to knowledge. 
The decision-maker’s interaction with the knowledge base forms cognitive situation 
awareness. The building of this situation awareness occurs as knowledge translates into 
understanding. Utilizing this situation to base decisions results in actions, and the 
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interaction of the decision-maker with the dynamic environment. The assessment of the 
decision-maker’s actions, and the resultant effects, translates understanding into wisdom. 
Data integration reduces the data saturation of the decision-maker and enables 
rapid building of a SOP. Entirely removing the human interface is inconceivable for a C2 
system, but creating an information system that can intelligently aggregate and 
summarize relevant authoritative (source, unaltered) data, will minimize the opportunity 
for decision-maker data saturation. Linking of relevant authoritative data to the decision-
maker is paramount to securing the competitive advantage in the decision-making 
process. 
3. Image Theory 
Image theory is based on the premise that human beings do not think or 
understand best in terms of data or information, but rather images or mental pictures of a 
given situation, and assimilate information most effectively in terms of visual images. 
Coup d’oeil, literally meaning stroke of the eye, references “the ability of gifted 
commanders to grasp what is happening on the battlefield” (p. 72) via an image that 
symbolizes their understanding of the situation (USMC, 1996). Taylor (1965) contends 
that in order to escape the norms of bounded rationality, or omnipotent knowledge of all 
alternatives, a decision-maker constructs a simplified model, or image, of the real 
situation based on the data present (p. 60). 
A second theory regarding decision making derived from observation and 
experimentation is observed decision behavior called naturalistic decision theory 
confronting the realizations that decision behavior seldom resembles normative processes 
(Beach, Mitchell, & Lee, 1998). According to Beach et al. (1998), image theory is a part 
of the evolution of descriptive theory from observations of real-life decision making 
based in cognitive psychology. 
The decision-maker within image theory is an individual acting alone, not unlike 
the USMC command structure during operations, considering values, morals, and ethics 
that delineate perceived behavior and define the principles on which the commander 
establishes the foundations for decision making (Beach et al., 1998). Motivations of the 
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decision-maker are driven by these principles combined with the achievement of a set of 
goals or objectives, which are achieved with a plan. Finally, when framing the decision, 
the cognitive effort is reduced based on the knowledge of policies, past events, and 
constraints emplaced within the context of the given situation. 
The images described are important to commanders for their decision-making 
matrix. The first image is a close-up of the situation at hand, best gained through personal 
observation and experience. The second image is an overall view of the situation, which 
allows commanders to make sense of force disposition and patterns throughout the 
battlefield to gauge differences between the actual and desired situations. The third image 
is the attempt to view the evolving situation through the eyes of the enemy commander to 
anticipate enemy intentions. The first picture is very detailed, but narrow in scope. The 
second provides a broad vantage point, but less detail. Information systems ideally allow 
individual customization management of views derived from raw and aggregated images 
with easy navigation between each. The third image involves a mental exercise limited by 
the inability to truly guess the enemies actions. Adding enemy activity modules into the 
simulation matrices and running them against suggested COAs would provide feedback 
loops for the decision-maker. 
Image theory recognizes two types of decisions, adoption and progress decisions, 
completed using either or both decision tests known as compatibility and profitability 
tests (Beach et al., 1998). Adoption decisions look at either adopting or rejecting 
candidate goals by eliminating unacceptable candidates based on incompatibility with the 
three images or selecting the best candidates from the screening based on the most 
attractive consequences defined in terms of the images. Progress decisions look at the 
plans and evaluate the compatibility between the forecasted future per plan 
implementation and the ideal future of the trajectory image. If they are incompatible then 
the plan is rejected in favor of a substitute. The compatibility test bases its evaluation on 
the compatibility between the candidate decision and the three images. The profitability 
test looks at the surviving candidates and selects the appropriate strategy as that which 
offers the greatest potential of being correct with the lowest estimated cost in terms of 
time, effort, and money. 
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4. Information Management Theory 
“Getting the right information, to the right person, at the right time” (p. 96), is 
critical for command and control (USMC, 1996). The timely dissemination of appropriate 
information is the foundation for information management. There are two basic principles 
for communication initiation: supply (push) and demand (pull) (Kahan, Worlev, & Stasz, 
2000). The principle of information supply is based on information from a source being 
pushed to the user on a schedule or as soon as it is obtained. This principle is 
advantageous for timely access without requests, but it requires anticipation of necessity 
and can quickly lead to information overload without some sort of filter. The demand 
principle of information theory lies dormant until a request for information (RFI) is made, 
and upon request, the demand disseminates down the chain of command until reaching 
the gathering source. Often this can lead to untimely fulfillment of the RFI or 
unnecessary degradation in the performance of the gathering entity. 
The decision-maker with little to no situation awareness must rely on the IS to 
provide information. Future systems must be capable of aggregating data derived from 
multiple sensor sources and comparing acquired information to mission specifications. 
This aggregation capability could be done at higher, lateral and lower echelons to get 
combined with autonomous activity to provide the decision-maker with a product for 
requesting further information demands. The autonomous inputs in conjunction with 
higher, lateral, and lower echelon inputs build the baseline image for the decision-maker 
and increase his/her situation awareness. 
One method that a commander can utilize to easily mitigate the inefficiency of 
information dissemination is by using Van Creveld’s “directed telescope” (Van Creveld, 
1985, p. 75). The “directed telescope” has been utilized throughout history as a way for 
the military commander to receive reports from outside the normal information reporting 
chain (Van Creveld, 1985, p. 75). Van Creveld (1985) explains that this means of 
reporting was necessary in order to avoid the “numerous stages through which they pass 
and the more standardized the form in which they are presented, the greater the danger 
that they will become so heavily profiled, (and possibly sugar-coated or merely distorted 
by the many summaries) as to become almost meaningless” (p. 75). This form of 
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“information pull” is best suited to the military philosophy of decentralized command and 
the commander’s critical information requirements and is limited in usage as observers 
have distance (can’t see farther than a few miles) and vision (presence of darkness) 
constraints. 
The way in which information is disseminated from one node to another is also 
important when considering information management. The broadcast method transmits 
information from a source to many (or all) users simultaneously, which is timely and 
efficient for generic information, but not ideal for specific commander’s requirements 
and again can lead to information overload rather quickly. In point-to-point 
transmissions, information is sent from the source node to specific user nodes, either all 
at once, or the information can be channeled through each node enroute to the final user. 
This method is slower and can lead to distortion of the data, but each node can act as a 
filter, integrating or analyzing information tailoring the outputs for the commander’s 
specific requirements. 
5. Decision-Making Theory 
Command and control procedures strive to enhance the decision-making ability of 
the commander. Uncertainty is inherent in military command and control decision 
making due to physics-based built-in errors in sensors reporting on the ground truth, and 
the enemy’s unpredictability. The Commander attempts to reduce uncertainty by 
gathering more information, but often the time required to gather this extra information is 
unacceptable for the given time constraints of the situation. The relevant elements of 
information getting to the decision-maker in the ideal amount of time are a better scenario 
than the inherent stagnation waiting for all of the information to be gathered. 
Scholars provide two basic theories of human-based decision making as an 
analytical process and as an intuitive process (Klein, 1989; Kahneman, 2011). The 
analytical process involves the time-consuming review of machine-generated courses of 
action against a set of criteria to achieve the optimal solution via machine reasoning. 
Intuitive decision making, which is generally quicker, relies on a commander’s judgment 
based on experience, training, and reflection to derive the appropriate decisions to given 
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situations based upon the significant elements of a given situation. Rather than gaining 
optimization in this type of situation, the commander elects to find a satisficing solution 
to the problem based on the idea that the conduct of war is an art vice a science (Simon, 
1956). Typically intuitive decision making is associated with time-sensitive situations 
during combat when delays cause loss of life and analytical decision making is associated 
with deliberate actions such as contingency planning of supply ratios or capability 
requirements. Despite being conceptually distinct, these basic theories of decision making 
are rarely mutually exclusive (USMC, 1996). Information systems that place a human on 
the loop provide the decision-maker with enhanced machine thinking to achieve 
efficiencies in time and accuracy of decisions. Risk simulators that run COAs versus 
enemy action matrices drastically reduce the amount of time spent in the analytical 
process of human-based decision making. 
6. Recognition-Primed Decision Model 
Klein (1989) described the Recognition-Primed Decision Model (RPD) as a 
decision-making strategy that is adaptable to various situations. Depending on the 
decision-maker’s “recognition and familiarity of the situation the decision-maker can 
react to cues and expectancies when visualizing and implementing their decision” (p. 58-
59). This model is reliant upon the decision-maker’s intuition, which is heavily dependent 
upon experience. Furthermore, Klein (1989) contends that “decision-making is the fusion 
of situation assessment and mental simulation” (as cited in Morris and Mitchell, 1995, 
3845). Morris and Mitchell (1995) stated that “people use situation assessment to 
generate a plausible course of action and mental simulation to evaluate that course of 
action” (p. 3845). 
The RPD is a model, which suggests that by providing the decision-maker with 
the facilities to increase situation awareness, the decision-maker will be able to make 
more efficient decisions. In order to achieve this higher state of situation awareness 
requires what Hanratty et al. (2009) stated is the “alignment of the decision maker’s 
mental model with the intelligent software agents working on their behalf” (p. 1). 
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C. INTELLIGENCE 
The theory of intelligence within the Marine Corps relies on the effective use of 
information, which has been processed into knowledge, about the enemy and the 
operational environment of the unit to support the decision-maker in the evaluation 
process to reduce, not eliminate, the uncertainty that permeates the battlefield (USMC, 
1997b). According to MCDP 2 (1997b), intelligence is a central component of command 
and control corresponding with operations and logistics in preparation and planning to 
provide the opportunity for success in war. Sun-Tzu (6 century B.C./1991) stated “Know 
the enemy, know yourself; victory is not in danger; when you know sky and earth, 
victory is inexhaustible” (p. 87). 
USMC intelligence assets strive to achieve these objectives: provide timely, 
accurate, and relevant knowledge about the enemy and environment and assist in 
protecting friendly forces via counterintelligence (USMC, 1997b). Images enhance 
understanding for decision-makers and intelligence analysts strive to process information 
into knowledge about the enemy and provide the commander with an accurate image of 
the current reality. Intelligence, like information, is perishable with time and too much 
information will overload the decision-maker. As a process, intelligence activities make 
up a significant portion of the observation, orientation, and action phases of the OODA 
loop. 
The information revolution created an environment of easy access to the vast 
amounts of data and information collected on a regular basis, creating the danger of 
overload without properly emplaced filters and aggregators (USMC, 1997b). MCDP 2 
(1997b) contends information systems are capable of graphically displaying data and 
information in a meaningful visual form, but still demonstrate difficulties generating 
knowledge and understanding, which requires human cognition and judgment. 
1. Intelligence Characteristics 
Quantifiably tangible factors provide the foundation to develop a better 
understanding of the enemy, but the intangible factors, which shape the enemy’s actions 
during conflict, provide the greatest insight (USMC, 1997b). The intelligence process 
 27 
endeavors to understand the factors that shape the enemy’s behavior in order to explain 
enemy activities thoroughly, thereby identifying enemy centers of gravity, critical 
vulnerabilities, and limitations to exploit (USMC, 1997b). MCDP 2 (1997b) states that 
certain characteristics of intelligence are exhibited as effective intelligence according to 
the Marine Corps’ theory of intelligence. 
USMC (1997b) intelligence activities focus on seven characteristics including: 
objectivity, thoroughness, accuracy, timeliness, usability, relevancy, and availability. 
Intelligence must be objective, free from bias and distortion of human interpretation and 
manipulation to conform to preconceived notions or support prior conclusions. 
Characteristics such as timeliness, usability, and availability, are mutually supportable. 
These characteristics approximate that information must be provided to the decision-
maker in a clear and concise format that enables timely action. According to MCDP 2 
(1997b), information that is thorough and accurate, which means sufficient in depth to 
satisfy requirements and factually correct, are at odds with timeliness because 
intelligence is perishable with time. Lastly, intelligence must be relevant; meaning 
pertinent to the level of command intended and significantly bear upon the situation in 
question (USMC, 1997b). 
2. Intelligence Classes 
According to MCDP 2 (1997b), two classes of intelligence are included in theory: 
descriptive intelligence, which describes past and current conditions, and estimative 
intelligence, which attempts to predict future conditions. Descriptive intelligence has a 
basic component, which is general background knowledge describing open source 
characteristics of hostile nations and their military forces, and a current component, 
which are more changeable factors, traditionally more specific than basic intelligence but 
less reliable and harder to obtain (USMC, 1997b). Estimative intelligence focuses on 
potential developments, attempting to evaluate previously gathered information to 
anticipate enemy actions and anticipate possible future movements or scenarios (USMC, 
1997b). MCDP 2 (1997b) asserts that the two classes of intelligence are distinct, 
descriptive focusing on capabilities and estimative distinguishing intentions, but 
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inseparable in a decision-maker’s consideration of all pertinent data. Any effective 
intelligence picture must provide insight into both (USMC, 1997b). 
3. Intelligence Collection 
The collection of intelligence begins the flow of data into the decision-making 
cycle. The modern battlespace has an abundance of sensors that relay unfiltered data to 
the decision-maker. According to Builder, Bankes, and Nordin (1999), the modern 
decision-maker is faced with the problem of having “too much information, rather than 
too little” (p. 1). Though technology has evolved giving the modern warfighter many 
tools, the command and control process has lagged behind in being able to efficiently and 
effectively implement these tools. The modern decision-maker needs to have the ability 
to rapidly interpret the abundance of data presented in order for the data to be 
transformed into relevant information to base a decision upon. 
In order to more accurately interpret presented data, the decision-maker must have 
an understanding of the method of how the data was collected. According to Waltz 
(1998), the utility of the data collected “is a function of both the accuracy and timeliness 
of information delivered to the user” (p. 72). Information must be derived from an 
authenticated sensor and stream of data. If the decision-maker has to question the 
authenticity of the data stream, the utility of data and competitive advantage is lessened, 
if not lost. 
Research by Lim, Moon, and Bertino (2010) addressed the importance of the 
trustworthiness of collected data. According to Lim et al. (2010), the utility of vast sensor 
networks will be dependent upon the “assessment of the trustworthiness of the collected 
data and indicating to the decision-maker the trustworthiness of the data” (p. 2). Lim et 
al. (2010) suggested attaching a trust score to collected data. The assessment of the 
trustworthiness of the data relative to other sensors can aid the decision-maker during 
their decision-making process. This method will allow the decision-maker to focus, and 
base their decision upon data with higher trust scores. 
Bertino, Dai, Lim, and Lin (2008) suggested that the “core requirements for data 
integrity control systems are based upon information-flow control, data verification, 
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prevention of fraud and errors, and autonomous data integrity validation” (p. 247). 
Similarly, Waltz (1998) stated, “information utility is a function of both reliability for and 
availability to the user” (p. 73). In summary, the utility of the data acquired is limited by 
its trustworthiness, authenticity, and reliability. 
4. Semiotics and Visualization 
The translation of data to higher levels of the DIKUW framework can be 
accomplished through the use of semiotics. The use of semiotics has been useful. 
According to Vickers, Faith, and Rossiter (2013), “semiotics is the study of the creation 
and interpretation of signs” (p. 1049). Signs, or raw data collected from sensors, sit at the 
lowest level of the DIKUW hierarchy. Without interpretation of this data, it will not 
matriculate to higher levels on the DIKUW hierarchy. According to Vickers et al., 
(2013), “data is purposefully collected from the real world and, via mappings, 
representations are produced. These are used in turn for meaning making and drawing 
inferences about the data. The visualization process encompasses cognition in the 
observer’s mind” (p. 1050). Therefore, through the visualization of complex data; higher 
levels of the DIKUW hierarchy can be achieved quicker. 
The dynamic environment in which the decision-maker must build a SOP is 
constantly changing. Meystel (2003) states that semiotics offers the decision-maker the 
ability to conceptualize the dynamic environment: 
By constructing signs and systems of signs, by creating and maintaining 
laws of symbols formation and interpretation, by arranging them into a 
multi-resolution (multi-scale) system, by discovering rules of 
transformation between levels of resolution and between the symbolic 
system and the reality (re: symbol grounding), semiotics works as a tool of 
constructing the system of world representation, its interpretation and 
meaning extraction. As soon as this representation is ready, semiotics-
teaches us how to make decisions upon this representation, create plans 
and generate activities. (p. 419) 
Building a SOP of a dynamic environment will not yield situation awareness with 
complete certainty, but visualizations that match a human’s cognitive environment model 
closer will help the decision-maker understand and orient themselves more efficiently. 
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According to Zheng, Wang, Luo, Cao, and Qing (2011), assisted by visualizations, “large 
amounts of information can be displayed in a visual specific way…that will promote a 
deeper understanding to the decision-maker which will help them to observe and 
analyze…and improve the ability of decision-making performance” (p. 781). 
D. LOGISTICS 
The USMC (1997c) theory of logistics acknowledged the importance to 
warfighting and established operational possibility including a definition of logistics as 
the provision of combat power, flow of materiel into the area of operations, and the 
sustainment of resources throughout operations. The most important decision for the 
Commander with regard to logistics is how to effectively use the limited resources 
available to accomplish the ultimate mission. There exists a dynamic relationship 
between logistics and operations, but ultimately logistics sets the outer limit on 
possibilities for operational feasibility throughout all levels of warfare (USMC, 1997c). 
Advancements in information systems have significant effects upon logistics functions 
including better information processing and communication that improve resource 
management and open information networks allowing easier exchange of data, 
information, and processes. 
The MAGTF Commander’s focus on tactical logistics sustains the force in 
combat, which involves the actual performance of the logistics functions with an 
understanding of the enabling support of the operational level of logistics and the 
foundation of strategic logistics utilities (USMC, 1997c). It is crucial that the decision-
maker’s information system’s logistics function reaches higher, lower, and laterally in 
order to best support ongoing operations. Commander’s need to ascertain the common 
logistics picture by analyzing available data pulled from the common logistics database 
and displayed on their personal devices. 
1. Science of Logistics 
Logistics is the most concrete factor that determines the outcome in warfare based 
on facts, relationships, and rules that form the basis for calculation and prediction 
(USMC, 1997c). MCDP 4 (1997c) provides standard planning factors and formulas are 
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available to predict the necessities for movement and sustainment of forces to overcome 
the passive obstacles: time, terrain, and distance. Due to these available calculations and 
passive obstacles, the ratio of inputs to outputs is more predictable for the logistics 
function of war than operations or intelligence (USMC, 1997c). Analytical tools, vice 
simple templates, are still required for proper planning for any situation, in order to adjust 
to changes in assumptions. The data required for analysis is typically of a structured 
nature and easily assimilated into online analytical processing tools (OLAP) available to 
the decision-maker. 
2. Logistics System 
The Marine Corps (1997c) acknowledged a system of logistics based upon “a 
distribution system composed of bases and procedures” (p. 45) and the established 
command and control system. Without arguing the importance of the ideal operating and 
staging base layout of an inherently expeditionary force like the Marine Corps, whether 
ashore or afloat, and the push-pull procedures needed to ensure fulfillment of required 
resources, no logistics system is effective without the implementation of adequate 
command and control (USMC, 1997c). Linking the distribution system to the planning 
and execution of operations is the design foundation for a logistics information system 
application. Information technology accomplishes three tasks for the Commander while 
balancing effectiveness with efficiency: anticipating future requirements, properly 
allocating resources based on prioritization, and dealing with the uncertainty inherent in 
combat (USMC, 1997c). As is common with commercial sector logistics functions, 
military logistics entities are moving toward a just-in-time concept of logistics in order to 
improve the efficiency to effectiveness ratio. 
IT logistics systems are increasingly being implemented into the execution of 
military logistics functions as a force multiplier enhancing planning and execution. These 
systems are generally used “to process support requests, track resources, store 
consumption rates and usage data, estimate future requirements, and develop schedules 
for orders and deliveries” (USMC, 1997c, p. 113). Additionally, logistics information 
systems exchange resource data and distribute real-time allocation, laydown, and 
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resource movement information throughout applicable commands. These tools are 
automated for use by logistics technicians, but decision-makers need improved IS for 
analytical purposes in their planning and execution tasks for operations. 
Integrating logistics factors into the operational planning and decision-making 
templates is now possible with logistics IS. Near real time information located in the data 
warehouses is accessible through the IT architecture. Current systems are capable of 
conducting analytics regarding estimated capabilities, trends and resource tracking to 
incorporate into planning and execution decisions. Although disconnected applications 
are capable of these techniques, the ideal technology places the commander on-the-loop 
of information workflow-driven exchange between logistics and operational planning and 
execution allowing each decision-maker to customize integration of supply and demand 
workflows. 
E. PROVENANCE, LINEAGE, AND PEDIGREE 
Pedigree, commonly referred to as provenance and lineage, is the “quality of 
data” that is being utilized in a database (Glavic & Dittrich, 2007, p. 227). According to 
Glavic and Dittrich (2007), data warehouses are comprised of data integrated across 
many sources. Often, the quality and source of this data comes into question when the 
decision-maker utilizes this data to construct a representative model of the environment. 
Due to the various sources of data, and multiple users utilizing the data across many 
databases, the original source data is regarded with higher utility. This data can be 
thought of as authoritative data, which is the original, unaltered, source data. The 
authoritative data is often copied, or represented, in other databases in the data 
warehouse. 
When utilizing the data to form an accurate picture, the decision-maker needs to 
utilize the authoritative data, vice data that has already been manipulated. By applying a 
pedigree rating to the authoritative data, analytics can be performed on “organizational 
workflows” to identify underlying patterns (Glavic & Dittrich, 2007, p. 228). 
Furthermore, according to Glavic and Dittrich (2007) the use of authoritative data lends 
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itself to “interactive statistical environments, visualization and knowledge discovery in 
databases (KDD)” (p. 228). 
As complex organizations look to integrate across multiple data streams, the value 
in the end architecture lies within the utilization of the authoritative data. During the 
analysis portion, greater interpretation of provenance and pedigree will be applied to 
knowledge visualizations and the implementation into DSS. Provenance, lineage, and 
pedigree possess additive implications toward the quality of the data utilized within the 
DSS. 
F. SUMMARY 
Decision-making theories such as Boyd’s OODA Loop, the DIKUW Hierarchy, 
Image theory, Information Management Theory, and Decision Making Theory suggest 
that the timely processing of relevant data to information is integral to maintaining highly 
accurate situation awareness from which to base decisions. The use of Decision Support 
Systems (DSS) such as graphical user interfaces and visualizations can more efficiently 
and rapidly aid the commander in achieving a higher degree of situation awareness of the 
battlefield or his own forces. 
The use of a graphical user interface or visualizations as a DSS allows the 
commander to gain rapid situation awareness; however, this representation is only as 
accurate as the data supplied to the DSS from the data warehouse. Accurate source data 
will enable a highly accurate representation to be pushed to the commander. From this 
picture the commander will have a higher degree of certainty from which to base their 
decision. The rapid transformation of uncorrelated data to relevant information will 
enable a more efficient and accurate foundation to base a decision. The rapid orientation 
to the situation, and attaining the necessary level of situation awareness to base a decision 
upon, will enhance operational agility. 
The United States Marine Corps has embodied a decentralized command 
structure. Currently, United States Marine Corps commanders have to pull information 
from command and control systems and subordinates; rather, than having information 
pushed to respective command tiers. In order to maximize the agile benefits that a 
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decentralized command structure offers, USMC doctrine and command and control 
infrastructure needs to be modernized to reflect the technological enhancements that 
corporations such as Amazon, UPS, and FedEx have embraced in utilizing graphical user 




III. DECISION-MAKERS’ CRITICAL INFORMATION 
According to the Deployable Training Division (DTD) J7 (2013), Commander’s 
Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs) are acute components of information 
identified by the commander for facilitating timely decision making and are developed to 
support two major activities: understanding in an increasingly complex environment and 
decision making. These two activities are achieved by linking information requirements 
to execution of future options within the operational plan. The research focus is at the 
MAGTF Commander level of campaign analysis, but the models are capable of 
employment throughout the continuum of command. 
CCIRs doctrinally contain two elements: priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) 
and friendly force information requirements (FFIRs) (DTD, 2013). Throughout 
execution, continuous mission assessment is conducted and depicted within the digital 
world model (DWM) as a shared operational picture (SOP). By leveraging the decision 
support system (DSS), the SOP promotes shared situation awareness via rolling-up to the 
upper command level or drilling-down to the lower command level to obtain a holistic 
knowledge. Based on shared situation awareness, CCIRs direct the collection plan, 
analysis, and dissemination of information to support decision-makers in setting ideal 
conditions for operations. Ultimately the decision-maker with the most inclusive holistic 
view of the mission, based on the SOP, dictates PIRs. CCIRs belong exclusively to a 
particular commander within an area of operation (AO) and are a product of mission 
analysis, updated throughout the evolution of an operation (Joint Staff, 2011). 
PIRs focus on the enemy and the environment for operations, while FFIRs focus 
on friendly forces and supporting capabilities (Joint Staff, 2011). Within the scope of the 
information hierarchy depicted in Figure 3, PIRs and FFIRs reside in the realm of 
knowledge, derived from the analysis conducted on essential elements of information 
(EEI) and essential elements of friendly information (EEFI). EEI and EEFI are data 
streams that require analysis in order to provide proper scope to the information reported 
to the commander. Algorithmic models biased with user inputs in conjunction with the 
decision-maker’s staff, which possess an understanding of the mission and unit roles, are 
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utilized to create higher levels of information from the raw data streams to produce the 
PIRs and FFIRs, which the commander has approved as CCIRs. The commander 
conducts personnel cognitive reasoning on these CCIRs and with the addition of 
experience, reduces uncertainty in understanding the operational situation to generate 
decisions focused on beneficial outcomes. 
 
Figure 3.  CCIR and Information Hierarchy Integration Model 
(from DTD, 2013) 
Operational commanders at the MAGTF level must broaden their CCIRs to 
support time-sensitive execution as well as long-term mission planning (DTD, 2013). The 
selected CCIRs must provide knowledge, vice simply data and information. Additional 
attributes of broader CCIRs include collection prioritization and focused analysis with 
detailed understanding of the higher and lower echelon desired end states through shared 
data model to achieve a SOP. An automatic or semi-automatic aggregation (via 
summarization) of operationally relevant prioritized data sets will alleviate bandwidth 
saturation for the commander’s network and reduce the commander’s workload. 
Increasing decentralization of the decision matrix to the appropriate level of command 
delegates the CCIRs retention requirements from higher headquarters units to lower units, 
thereby relieving stress on collection and analysis resources. 
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CCIRs span the future and current event horizon for operations (DTD, 2013). 
Future operations and planning focus on the what’s next and the what if branch and 
sequel plans required of operational units based on the assessment of available enemy 
and friendly information, including joint and coalition partners. Current operations focus 
on task accomplishment and execution. 
The information needs of the commander are neither finite nor applicable across 
all operational scenarios (Kahan, Worley, & Stasz, 2000). The complexity of the 
operational environment exponentially increases the potential options that operations may 
take. Unlike tactical level commanders whose CCIRs may contain specifically worded 
PIRs and FFIRs, operational level commanders derive decisions based on a broader 
assessment of the measures of effectiveness (MOEs) and further analysis of the overall 
strategic or operational objectives (DTD, 2013). 
Kahan, Worley, and Stasz (2000) also emphasize that information necessary for 
the decision-maker is not simply data streams from one unit or another, but instead fused 
data from the DWM by linking the DSS to the knowledge base maintained by the DWM. 
Enemy intentions are estimates only due to individual free will; therefore predictions are 
based on strategic objectives, political climate, and economic conditions supported by 
intelligence analysis. Critical information mitigates a portion of uncertainty in decision 
making, but cannot relieve all uncertainty. Ideally the commander keeps CCIRs narrow in 
scope, but fluid enough to correspond to changing scenarios. To manage this difficult 
balance the IS may impose a requirement on the DWM to generate a CCIR library of 
templates for the decision-maker’s semantic search and data entry. 
A. INTELLIGENCE 
Intelligence requirements focused on the enemy force and operational 
environment doctrinally are established as PIRs. An intelligence requirement is an 
unknown piece of information about the enemy or environment, a question about the 
threat or the battle space, necessary for the decision-maker to act (USMC, 2003). During 
mission analysis, the Joint Staff (2013a) identifies significant information gaps about the 
enemy and operational environment that require further collection of information or 
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intelligence production. The commander has overall approval authority of all CCIRs, to 
include PIRs, but relies on staff recommendations for priority level distribution. PIRs are 
developed for each phase of an operation and are updated throughout the execution of 
operations based on the flexible nature of warfare. 
Most PIRs are in reference to the adversary’s intended Course Of Action (COA), 
most dangerous COA, and enemy critical vulnerabilities (USMC, 2003). The intended 
COA is prioritized at the highest level due to its relative likeliness of occurring as 
opposed to the most dangerous, but less likely to occur, COA. The critical vulnerabilities 
of the enemy are equally as important as the adversary’s intended COA and necessary to 
understand for the implementation of maneuver warfare doctrine. Analysis of this type 
requires the collection of data and available information as well as experience and 
judgment. Fundamental to the task of the analyst in obtaining the PIRs for the decision-
maker is helping the commander visualize the possible threats within the AO (Haigler, 
2012). Enemy force laydown, movement, location, size, capability, and readiness are 
critical elements of information necessary to the decision-maker, particularly in reference 
to the enemy centers of gravity. Additionally, high-value target (HVT) and high-value 
individual (HVI) location and disposition are established criteria for the decision-maker 
in the current operational environment. A thorough list of PIRs suitable for any operating 
environment is depicted in Table 1. These intelligence information requirements are ideal 
for a decision-maker in any AO to begin planning and conducting operations. 
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Priority Intelligence Requirements for the Decision-Maker 
1. Severe weather forecast or change affecting current or planned operations, 
air, land, or sea. 
2. Graphic overlay for historical enemy attacks by category based on 
commander input and selected timeline. 
3. Estimates on Enemy intentions, predicated based upon enemy’s assumed 
strategic objectives and predictive analytics based on historic attacks and 
enemy movement. 
4. Enemy force laydown (location), size, capability, and readiness. 
5. Relevant enemy unit movements: expected and unexpected. 
6. Relevant changes in enemy protective posture. (IADS, Watch rotations, 
etc.) 
7. Indicator of local populace feeling toward coalition operations within their 
sphere of influence. 
8. HVT/HVI location and movement. 
9. Gain or Loss of a human intelligence asset, circumstances, and their Area 
of Influence. 
10. New analysis report for selected AO or HVI/HVT. 
11. Human Intelligence analysis reports for reference. (text-rich documents 
searchable by multiple criteria) 
12. Video surveillance stream in reference to HVT/HVI. 
13. Video surveillance stream in reference to current operations and strikes. 
Table 1.   Priority Intelligence Requirements (after Joint Staff, 2013a; Kahan, 
2000; USMC, 1997b; USMC, 2003; USMC, 2004) 
Haigler (2012) contends that sources of information for evaluation are obtained 
from a variety of resources. The techniques for acquiring such information as force 
laydown, location, and movement of enemy forces and HVTs ranges from Human 
Intelligence (HUMINT) and Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) sources to the use of Imagery 
Intelligence (IMINT) sources such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and satellites. The 
size, capability, and readiness rates of an enemy force is derived from HUMINT as well 
as Open-source Intelligence (OSINT) sources typically assimilated prior to conflict. 
Assumptions in pre-operation activities are bolstered with HUMINT details to increase 
accuracy. Bottom line is analysts must acquire information from all available sources to 
reduce biases in judgment or cause blindness to a threat (Haigler, 2012). 
EEIs referencing the physical operational environment gathered via IMINT, 
SIGINT, OSINT, and other sources represent the “ground truth” of the Physical World 
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Model (PWM). The PWM, via information extraction, is seamlessly integrated with the 
DWM as the visual depictions. The advancement of this fusion concept is an ongoing IT 
capability advancement. Social aspects of the operational environment, which are derived 
from HUMINT sources, are not so easily created, often requiring deeper analytical 
evaluation by intelligence professionals and reported up the chain-of-command with 
levels of hypothesis. These resources derive knowledge based on time sensitive 
information irrelevant after an unspecified period. Typical documentation is text-rich 
data, time consuming to search and difficult to portray via graphical visual format, 
instead requiring textual based IS for depiction. Commanders must rely heavily on 
intelligence resources and analysts to provide appropriate information to fulfill PIRs. 
However, access to the basic EEIs must be available for the commander to view and 
support the conclusions of the analyst. 
Fulfilled PIRs exist to inform the commander of critical information, and also to 
help a decision-maker understand a prioritization of the type and level of intelligence 
resources required to support the operation (Joint Staff, 2013a). Continuous campaign 
assessment by higher headquarters along with prioritized PIRs justifies the tasking of 
national intelligence gathering resources and further intelligence capabilities. The 
probability of gaining access to national assets as resources is greatest when PIRs are in 
coordination with national priorities, and much less when the fulfillment of a PIR would 
require recuing of national resources. Answered PIRs lower the level of risk for a given 
operation, but are time relevant. When making information requests, they must be 
accompanied by the latest time for the intelligence to be of value to the Commander. 
Time constraints increase stress on national assets and decrease the probability of 
access to these resources. There is a dichotomy to timeliness of information. The 
usefulness of information is based on timeliness, and is most important to the operator. If 
the right information does not make it to the operator at the right time, more risk is 
incurred for the operation. Recuing information-gathering resources is also temporal. 
Different assets have different timelines and procedures for recuing based on the 
complexity of the systems. These two timelines are often at odds with one another and 
cause stress in the request process. Prioritization of information requirements provides a 
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mechanism for the commander and supporting unit to communicate necessity. 
Commander’s expect unsatisfied information requests due to the conflict of information 
timeliness at the expense of resource recuing, but continual request and operational 
necessity will, in a relatively (in operational terms) near future, force the requested 
resource recuing. It is understood this may happen at the expense of denying competing 
information requests with lower priorities. Essentially, this is a resource allocation 
problem requiring optimization. Management of intelligence requirements is essential for 
successful planning and implementation as well as ensuring no duplication of effort. As 
depicted in Figure 4, there are many contributors to the master intelligence requirements 
list, but only the decision-maker determines each priority, and the staff must confirm 
what requirements are actively being pursued and which are not. 
 
Figure 4.  Intelligence Requirements Management (from USMC, 2003) 
Continual assessment of the mission execution is essential to properly align 
intelligence operations and optimally allocate sensors to achieve campaign objectives. 
Additionally, maintaining open communication with outside agencies ensures updates 
regarding non-organic intelligence requirement achievement. 
 42 
B. OPERATIONS 
CCIRs related to operations are firmly established in doctrine as FFIRs (DTD, 
2013). These information requirements are linked to friendly force laydown, movement, 
location, size, capability, readiness, and personnel status (USMC, 2010). A MAGTF 
Commander needs to know where his forces are physically located within AO in order to 
reduce conflict of force movement and fires, redundancy of effort, and increase force 
protection against discovered enemy movements (USMC, 2001). The size of the unit is 
important for reference purposes to verify number of personnel within an AO. The 
capability of a unit is referenced not only to what they are trained to accomplish, but also 
what the unit is currently supplied to accomplish, whether that is in reference to 
ammunition and food, or number of helicopters and personnel carriers available for 
movement to an objective. 
A unit’s readiness is always a fluctuating factor that a commander needs to 
maintain knowledge of prior to placing a unit into action. Due to the fluctuation rates of 
such a variable it is important to maintain the most up to date information regarding such 
items as readiness. Readiness is exemplified in several formats including training, 
personnel, and materiel (USMC, 2001). A deployed unit should attain and maintain 
training levels at the appropriate threshold prior to and during deployments, but rates 
fluctuate within the continental United States (CONUS). The status of personnel and 
materiel readiness consistently oscillate due to sickness, injury, death, material 
degradation, and cyclical inspections. The minutia of unit readiness is far too much 
information for a MAGTF Commander to maintain at all times, but is important to have 
access too when relevant for a decision. 
Ideally a commander maintains a ‘God’s-Eye’ view of operational forces updated 
continuously via a database record populated by legacy information systems such as blue 
force tracker; a GPS based location database that auto-updates at prescribed intervals. 
Operational laydown and movement is the most important critical information 
requirement for a commander’s operational control and continuous situation awareness 
(USMC, 1996). Every unit commander should be permitted access to the ‘God’s-Eye’ 
view of operational force laydown and movement within the SOP architecture. 
 43 
Specificity down to the most basic combat unit, the four-Marine fire team, is expected as 
a system requirement. This requirement could easily create clutter for the displayed 
output and is not always necessary for the commander’s situation awareness. The level of 
clarity is ideally based on the level of resolution and entity aggregation levels the 
commander has been choosing interactively on the moving map application and other 
applications, not requiring a map, necessary for predictive and operational planning. The 
DSS must possess optional capabilities that are customizable (aka configurable) by the 
user for the aggregation attributes to display the views to avoid the clutter of the display 
and cognitive capability of the decision-maker. Table 2 lists the ideal operational 
information requirements for a decision-maker to plan and conduct operations within any 
AO. 
 
Operations Information Requirements for the Decision-Maker 
1. Friendly force laydown (location), size, capability, and readiness. 
2. Readiness indication of every unit within the overall command. 
3. Relevant unit movements: expected and unexpected. 
4. Notification of completion for each significant Operational Checklist event. 
5. Joint force or Coalition Force movement within AO. 
6. Status of NGO and other aid operations within the AO. 
7. Any transitory unit within the AO: intended routing and actual progression. 
8. Video surveillance stream in reference to current combat operation. 
9. Video surveillance stream in reference to current air-to-ground strike. 
10. Loss of a unit commander within the command structure. 
11. Details regarding captured Marine or shot down aircraft and first estimate 
on TRAP (tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel) mission status. 
12. Loss of a key communications node, facility, or retransmission site. 
13. Communication loss to any unit within the overall command or AO. 
Table 2.   Operations Information Requirements (after Joint Staff, 2011; 
Kahan, 2000; USMC, 1996; USMC, 2001; USMC, 2010) 
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The Marine Corps doctrinally incorporates centralized command with 
decentralized control allowing the sub-commanders to make the important tactical 
decisions in reference to their understood commander’s intent and operational objectives 
(USMC, 1996). It is important for the sub-commanders to make necessary decisions 
based on available information toward achieving the common objectives, but without 
pushing constant updates back to the commander’s staff. Autonomous information 
systems provide the commander with a continuously updated SOP. The SOP enhances 
the situation awareness (SA) of the decision-maker allowing the Commander to provide 
course corrections to subordinates as necessary or preserve continuous action without 
mandatory reporting breaks maintaining tempo in operations (USMC, 2014b). Course 
corrections are only relevant in operational situations conducted in conditions of little 
uncertainty and low friction. DSS cannot subjugate USMC doctrine of decentralized 
control and therefore in conditions of uncertainty, fog of war, Commander’s must 
maintain a balance between relying on the judgment of subordinate decision-makers on 
scene assumed to have the greatest SA of the current engagement first and Commander’s 
experience next. 
The sub-systems, such as blue force tracker also provide movement and location 
data to the superior commander at near-real time. This force laydown information allows 
the commander to track progress as compared to timelines and maintain situational 
awareness to the progress of ongoing operations. This type of information provides the 
commander necessary cognition of operational progress in order to determine placement 
of the reserve or redirection of limited fire support assets. This near-real time location 
information provides all commanders with progress in order to maintain situational 
awareness to the operational checklist progress as well, saving valuable time in 
unnecessary communication between subordinate and senior units regarding status 
updates. 
The secondary critical information requirements that a MAGTF Commander must 
maintain involve their forces’ readiness rates. Subordinate commanders incorporate this 
type of information into the shared data space via inputs, which enhances the SOP 
effectiveness. The information change provokes a status update or notification for the 
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MAGTF Commander’s system when specific criteria are met. Readiness rates are ideally 
relayed post engagement or operation, but are dependent on criteria provided by the 
MAGTF Commander. If specific criteria (rules) are reached, the subordinate commander 
is expecting the IS to generate an automatic trigger, enabling a “push to update” the 
superior commander based on standard benchmarks. Every commander provides inputs 
and corrections to the SOP to ease collaboration efforts between different echelons. 
Unit capability is also a secondary information requirement that is only important 
to the MAGTF Commander when it degrades from expected levels. This type of 
degradation could occur due to readiness degradation or materiel failure out of the 
positive control of the unit commander who experiences the capability degradation. 
These factors outside of the control of the unit commander may be unknown, however, 
the MAGTF Commander will still have access to the information, due to secondary 
reporting criteria from other unit’s readiness rates, such as a logistics unit. Utilizing the 
OLAP cube data model to manage the metadata for the SOP enhances propagation of 
newly reported and updated metadata throughout the chain of command and laterally 
through the operational force. The importance of linking one units readiness to another’s 
is essential to have correctly set up within the IS intelligence analysis and ideally would 
notify the superior commander when specific thresholds were reached. 
It is essential for the MAGTF Commander to maintain situational awareness to 
the ongoing friendly force laydown and up-to-date movement and locations in order to 
progress toward operational objectives and achieving Commander’s Intent. A graphical 
representation of friendly force locations provides the ideal picture for a superior 
commander to maintain such awareness. Unit name depictions, manpower readiness, and 
days of supply are important inclusions in the visualization mechanism and should be 
defaulted into the visualization environment of the DSS. Other readiness information is 
best suited as optional information for the visualization environment based on drill down, 
clutter, and customized to the individual cognitive ability of the decision-makers. Kahan 
et al. (2000) profess the dangers of overloading the commander with information, and the 
disastrous ramifications that ensue. The threat of information overload and display clutter 
mandate display systems provide secondary information in a visual notification format, 
 46 
such as a symbol color change or flicker, which could be hidden if the decision-maker 
desires. This allows the commander to better draw attention to the unit that needs the 
commander’s attention due to a better recognition of a specific situation that is dictated 
by thresholds configured into the information system. 
C. LOGISTICS 
Friendly force logistics and supply data is qualitative in nature and lends well to 
business intelligence methods for analysis and decision-making. Doctrinally, logistics 
and supply information is categorized as FFIR, but certain information is essential for the 
enemy’s situational awareness and could be adapted as EEFI (Joint Staff, 2013b). EEFI 
are no longer doctrinally incorporated into CCIR, but the Joint Staff (2013b) advises 
safeguarding EEFI from enemy detection or operations run the risk of compromise and 
failure. 
Logistics information and functions relevant to the MAGTF Commander spans all 
three levels of war from Strategic to Tactical requiring feedback from lower echelon units 
using continuous push updates of information from national and regional level entities. 
Current software capabilities infused into logistics decision support generate event 
notifications when changes or updates are entered into the database. Event updates are 
pushed to users within the SOP shared data model architecture. These events update 
trigger action sequences within the workflow for a functional area affected. Figure 5 
depicts the support and requirements flow of logistical functions within the MAGTF. 




Figure 5.  Logistics Information and Function Flow (from USMC, 2002) 
The logistics continuum, demonstrated in Figure 5, spans all three levels and each 
level has a corresponding set of functions. The MAGTF Commander focuses heavily on 
the Operational and Tactical level of the continuum. Operational logistics support major 
theater operations and coordinate closely with tactical logisticians to ensure the combat 
units possess the necessary resources. 
The interface of these data streams is often in different languages leading to 
difficulty integrating individual databases into one data warehouse. Essentially, the 
logistics C2 system would be the singular provider for decision-maker visibility into 
deployment surge and sustainment logistics, for all service components, mobility 
commands, contract organizations, and defense logistics agencies (Schrady, 1998). A 
baseline for logistics information requirements for the decision-maker within any AO is 
depicted in Table 3. These information requirements are the stepping off point for any 
planning and operational conduct regarding logistics for MAGTF Commander. 
  
 48 
Logistics Information Requirements for the Decision-Maker 
1. Sustainment Stock Levels. 
2. Alert at reaching below 75% of sustainment stock. 
3. Consumption rates of each consumable category, referenced by the 
commander’s prerogatives. 
4. Graphical trends in consumption rates: Planned versus Actual. 
5. Severe weather forecast or change affecting current or planned logistics 
movements by land, air, or sea. 
6. Theater lift capacity measured in reference to how many units can be 
moved at present and any requested future timeframe. 
7. Any time logistics support for the designated Main Effort degrades. 
8. Indications, warnings, or actual attacks on critical logistics nodes. 
9. Any Line of Communication (LOC) interdiction that disrupts distribution for a 
specified amount of time. 
Table 3.   Logistics Information Requirements (after Joint Staff, 2013b; 
Schrady, 1998; USMC, 1997c; USMC, 1999; USMC, 2002) 
The Marine Corps incorporated the Global Combat Support System-Marine Corps 
(GCSS-MC) Enterprise solution for combining the data streams relevant to supply and 
logistics information into one relational data warehouse. The goal of this overarching 
capability is to provide universal access and interoperability to information within the 
Marine Corps support functions (USMC, 1999). GCSS-MC is one of many Marine Corps 
Command and Control/Situational Awareness equipment modernization programs 
developed by Oracle USA Inc. Historically logistics data streams have not been 
integrated into a single distributed database, leading to difficulties integrating all logistics 
information into a single-source usable database schema. Differences in meta-data of the 
16 significant logistics information systems currently in use are still causing difficulties 
in the integration efforts for GCSS-MC, but future development efforts are focused on 
achieving greater interoperability (USMC, 2014a). 
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The decision-maker uses relevant logistics and supply data during planning and 
execution as operations mature. At the Strategic level this information is contained in the 
Global Status of Resources and Training System (GSORTS) data and includes categories 
such as supplies on-hand and equipment status within the logistics realm (Schrady, 1998). 
Decision-makers at the MAGTF level require end-item status at much greater detail than 
GSORTS data provides. Major systems, ships, aircraft, and vehicles need to be broken 
out and defined in terms of mission capability: fully mission capable, partial mission 
capable, or not mission capable. Numeric percentages are important for the decision-
maker and need to be incorporated as defaults for the visualization application. However, 
the mission capability of an asset, whether due to maintenance or supply, is not necessary 
for the decision-maker’s immediate consideration, but should be accessible when 
requested as an option for the visualization application. 
Sustainment stock levels are a crucial piece of information necessary for the 
decision-maker in planning operations. Projecting these levels in meaningful terms is 
essentially an algorithm, converting fuel in tons or pounds into days of supply (DoS) 
based on number of aircraft or sortie generation rates. These same types of algorithms 
can create DoS calculations for rations or ammunition supplies based on given rates of 
use. Planning factors never survive first contact with the enemy, nor are they highly 
predictable, therefore this is one area that benefits greatly by plotting forecasted rates 
against actual rates in order to determine trends and be proactive vice reactive. 
Idealistically logistics decision support systems provide three major attributes for 
the decision-maker. First, a logistics based IS provides visibility on all assets in the joint 
environment. They deliver accurate and time sensitive information on location, 
movement, readiness, and identity of units, personnel, equipment, and supplies (USMC, 
1999). Second, effective decision support tools would provide planners with capabilities 
such as “what-if” analysis of COAs, baseline comparisons to determine deviations during 
execution, and providing qualitative and quantitative values to logistics activities. Lastly, 
automated identification technology, such as bar codes, memory cards, and radio 
frequency tags, provide the most up to date information regarding location and movement 
status of property.  
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D. SUMMARY 
Critical information requirements are essential elements of the decision support 
systems for the MEF decision-makers and planners. The information necessary for 
commanders and staff to conduct COA analysis and selection is a derivative of the 
information requirements designated as the PIRs and FFIRs. CCIRs derive responses that 
facilitate timely decision-making as well as improve the SOP of the organization. The 
CCIRs, nominated in the research, necessary for the decision-maker to create SA for 
himself/herself are abstract enough to fulfill the planning requirements and objectives for 
any major military operation. 
Ultimately, PIRs and FFIRs integrate to create the SOP for the decision-maker. 
This SOP evolves throughout the hierarchical command structure as increased analysis is 
conducted upon the relevant information. Sharing the developments from this analysis 
transparently throughout the organizational structure increases the knowledge base and 
the SA of all echelons of the command hierarchy. 
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IV. THE DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEM 
According to Shim et al. (2011), a decision support system (DSS) is “computer 
technology solution that can be used to support complex decision making and problem 
solving” (p. 111). The DSS aids the decision-maker in processing available data and 
formulating a decision. Modern technology has enabled the collection of multitudes of 
data; however, the utility of this data is derived from the user’s ability to process the data 
into usable and relevant information from which to increase the situation awareness of 
the decision-maker. Gorry and Scott Morton (1971) argued that a decision-maker does 
not lack sufficient raw sensor data, but rather a decision-maker lacks a “method to 
understand and process readily available data” (p. 31) into information, knowledge, 
understanding, and wisdom. The struggle of the decision-maker to discern relevant 
information, from all available data sources, from which to base a decision is what 
Lowenthal (2003) has stated is the “wheat versus chaff problem” (p. 90). 
The process of integrating raw data into graph entity relationships, when possible, 
is an initial phase of fusion requiring correlation techniques. The transitioning of 
integrated data into knowledge requires applying higher levels of fusion. The cognitive 
consumption of the results of fusion at different levels, results in understanding. Acting, 
or making decisions, on acquired understanding, contributes to the accumulation of 
experience. The post decision assessment of actions results in states of wisdom. 
Throughout the transition of data into higher levels of the DIKUW hierarchy, a DSS can 
assist the decision-maker by presenting visualizations that quickly and accurately build 
the decision-makers situation awareness. 
A DSS can aid the decision-maker in processing available data. The DSS links the 
decision-maker to the raw live sensors and other authoritative sources stored in the data 
stores. These stores represent the physical world model (PWM). After the sensor data is 
correlated it is added to the knowledge base (KB), which reflects the states of the digital 
world model (DWM). The decision-maker is acting as a “human-in-the-loop” (p. 4) or a 
“human-on-the-loop,” (p. 4) depending on the latency requirements of the executed 
workflows (Hawthorne & Scheidt, n.d.). This allows the decision-maker to supervise 
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subsequent stages of fusion to generate mission-relevant knowledge. The decision-maker 
interacts with DWM through the DSS to glean required information and knowledge on 
which to base a decision. However, the decision-maker’s success is dependent upon the 
rapid acquisition of relevant information from the DSS, in which the user’s cognitive 
world model (CWM) is an accurate representation of the environment in which they 
operate. As the DSS becomes more predictive and prescriptive, the gap between the 
decision-maker’s CWM and the DSS lessens. According to Hayes-Roth (2006), this 
sublimation process may be described as decision-makers and the DSS becoming “hyper-
beings” (p. 6). 
Though the DSS can benefit a decision-making process, the capabilities of the 
DSS are dependent upon the level of structure of the dynamic environment in which 
decision-maker operates. Problems facing a decision-maker can range in spectrum from 
unstructured (e.g. HUMINT, OSINT, documents), to structured (e.g., traditional sensors, 
METOC), to multi-structured pixelated data. A DSS aids the decision-maker in different 
capacities given the level of structure of the problem. Despite the structure of the 
problem, the user interaction with the DSS will govern the efficiency from which the 
decision-maker can glean useful and actionable information. 
A. PROBLEM STRUCTURE 
Given a situation, which requires a decision, the decision-maker is faced with an 
environment that has differing levels of structure. According to Gorry and Scott Morton 
(1971), “structure” refers to the level of autonomy a computer system can have in a 
decision-making process (p. 29). In a structured system, decisions can be automated and 
left for the DSS to make the decision. An example of a structured system would be a 
thermostat. A thermostat can make the decision to turn on or off a heater once a 
predetermined temperature is reached with little to no human input. An unstructured 
system, according to Gorry and Scott Morton (1971), is a system in which “the human 
decision-maker must provide judgment and evaluation as well as insights into the 
problem definition” (p. 26). The role of human supervision is to provide insight into the 
entropy that exists in the dynamic environment, which is outside the capabilities of the 
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DSS. In order for the DSS to be functional across a greater spectrum of structured 
systems, the DSS must be programmed with the similar adaptive workflows that the 
human decision-maker is afforded. Without this agility, the DSS is limited to a rigid set 
of constraints and logic in a dynamic, and constantly changing, environment. 
The level of structure of the dynamic environment is dependent upon the level of 
structure of three interrelated categories. According to Simon (1960), these three 
categories are “intelligence, design, and choice” (p. 2). Young (1989) stated that by 
identifying the level of structure of each of the categories, the problem could be 
structurally categorized. According to Gorry and Scott Morton (1971) “a fully structured 
problem is one in which intelligence, design, and choice are highly structured” (p. 27). 
Jonas (2011) redefined these categories as follows (p. 100): 
• “Sense and Respond” (Intelligence function): The stage in which the 
dynamic environment is scanned for pattern recognition and anomaly 
detection, and/or identification of opportunities that will require decisions 
to be made and implemented. 
• “Report and Manage” (Fuse, Operational function): The stage in which 
possible courses of action which will compromise an alternative strategy 
are invented or otherwise generated or identified, developed, analyzed, 
and assessed for feasibility. 
• “Explore and Reflect” (Integrated function): The stage in which one of the 
alternative strategies is selected (decided upon) and subsequently 
implemented. 
Similar to the categorical components of intelligence, design, and choice; the 
level of structure associated with each of the Decision Theory Model components can 
determine the level of structure in the decision-making problem. According to Young 
(1989, p. 19-20) intelligence, design, and choice are replaced with the following Decision 
Theory Model components: 
• “States of Nature: A combination of conditions (particular “settings”) of 
the relevant variables, which are not controllable by the decision-maker 
(traditionally called “states of nature” although the conditions could be 
man-made by persons other than the decision-maker).” 
• “Strategies: Alternative strategies, defined as courses of action or a 
particular combination of “settings” of the variables under the control of 
the decision-maker.” 
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• “Outcome or Payoff: Interactions between each strategy and each state of 
nature that result in outcomes of importance to the decision-maker and 
which can be measured in some form of payoff units (often money).” 
• “Relationship between Strategies, States of Nature, and Outcomes, 
Payoffs: A criterion of analysis rule by which a decision-maker can assess 
the situation and select a particular strategy.” 
Young (1989) depicts categorizing a problem based upon the Decision Theory 
Model components in Figure 6.
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Figure 6.  Decision Problem Matrix (from Young, 1989, p. 20).






















Components of a decision problem Structured Semi Structured Unstructured
Outcomes, payoffs Identifiable (some unknown
Strategies Definable known, or unknown
"States of Nature" (relevant uncontrollable 
conditions) Known estimated; unknown
Relationships between Strategies, States of 
Nature, and Outcomes, payoffs Known some unknown.) unknown
"States of Nature" (Uncontrollable Conditions)
b) Degree of Structure in a Decision Problem
a) The Decision Theory Model of a Decision Problem
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Problem structure models by Gorry and Scott Morton (1971) and Young (1989) 
suggest that a problem of highly structured component variables equates to a highly 
structured problem. Given a highly structured problem, a DSS can operate at high levels 
of autonomy. The DSS can incorporate decision trees and algorithms in which to operate. 
Gorry and Scott Morton (1971) stated, “The Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) formula in 
an inventory control problem is an example of a highly structured decision-making 
problem, in which the DSS can work at high levels of autonomy” (p. 27). 
Contrary to the highly structured problem, is a decision-making process in which 
the problem components are highly unstructured. Given a problem with unstructured 
components, human interaction is required in the decision-making process. According to 
Turban and Aronson (1998) an unstructured problem is one in which “the processes are 
fuzzy, complex problems for which there are not cut and dried solutions…where human 
intuition is often the basis for decision making” (p. 12). Turban and Aronson (1998) 
suggest examples of an unstructured process are “planning new services, hiring a new 
executive, or choosing between research and development projects for the upcoming 
year” (p. 12). In an unstructured problem, the flawless and efficient interaction of the user 
with the DSS is paramount. 
It is important to note that the DSS is not intended to replace the human cognitive 
function of the decision-making process in an unstructured problem. In a structured 
problem, the role of the decision-maker is minimal; however, in an unstructured problem, 
the user’s role is integral. In a highly structured problem, a DSS is highly autonomous 
with accurate models constructed that allow the DSS to achieve quantifiable objectives. 
However, in an unstructured problem; these objectives are less quantifiable and tangible; 
and user input is required. Given an unstructured problem, the DSS and the decision-
maker (user) work in concert. Keen and Scott Morton (1978) argued that “Decision 
Support Systems couple the intellectual resources of individuals with the capabilities of 
the computer to improve the quality of decisions” (as cited in Turban & Aronson, 1998, 
p. 13). Whether the problem is structured or unstructured, the goal of the DSS, according 
to Young (1989) is the “increase (improvement, not optimization) in effectiveness in 
reaching ultimate objectives rather than mere processing efficiency” (p. 1). 
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The user’s processing of information presented by the DSS is often the limiting 
factor of the decision-making process. This idea is refuted by Lowenthal (2003), who 
stated that computers (and DSSs) have “increased the ability to manipulate information, 
but the amount of derived intelligence has not increased space” (p. 80). Gorry and Scott 
Morton (1971) stated that a DSS “is an interactive computer based system, which help 
decision-makers utilize data and models to solve unstructured problems” (as cited in 
Turban & Aronson, 1998, p. 13). Furthermore, Young (1989) stated that a “DSS provide 
the means for interactive, user controlled, human-computer dialogues to help decision-
makers cope with semi- structured (somewhat fuzzy) decision processes” (p. 1). The level 
of structure (unstructured vs. semi-structured) is indicative of the degree of uncertainty in 
the dynamic environment. Decreasing the gap between the user and the DWM, by 
introducing cognitive capabilities into the DWM, can mitigate this uncertainty. 
B. COMPONENTS OF THE DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEM 
The DSS has similar constructs whether the problem being addressed is a 
structured or unstructured problem. However, the role and responsibilities of the user in 
the DSS increase in an unstructured environment. According to Turban, Aronson, and 
Liang (as cited in Kamel, 2006, p. 12-13), the DSS is composed of the following 
subsystems: 
• “Data management subsystem: 
• Includes database that contains relevant data for the situation and is 
managed by a database management system (DBMS) application. 
• Connected to the corporate data warehouse (with decision-making 
data) accessed via database web server.” 
• “Model management subsystem: 
• Software package that includes financial, statistical, management 
science, quantitative models providing analytical capabilities 
called Model Base Management System (MBMS) that usually runs 
on application server.” 
• “Knowledge-based management subsystem: 
• Support subsystem providing intelligence for decision-makers 
• Known as organizational knowledge base.” 
• “User interface subsystem”  
• Surface that enables “users to communicate and interact with the 
DSS.” 
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• “Interaction between users (decision-makers) and computing.” 
• “Web browser provides a user-friendly and easy interface.” 
• The user 
• The decision-maker or individual utilizing the DSS. 
Tripathi (2011) added to these components by linking the DSS to external entities 
such as “other computer based systems, internet, intranets, extranets, and organizational 
knowledge base” (p. 113). Trapathi (2011) depicts the components of a DSS in Figure 7.
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Figure 7.  A Schematic View of a DSS (from Tripathi, 2011, p. 113)
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In an unstructured problem, where the user has an integral role in the decision-
making process, the link between the DSS and the user is the user interface. Gorry and 
Scott Morton (1971) and Young (1989), stated that in an unstructured problem, the DSS 
is an interactive system of which the user is an integral part of the DSS. Therefore, the 
full capability of the DSS is rooted in the efficiency and effectiveness in which the DSS 
can most accurately present relevant information and knowledge to the user. 
Visualizations provide the capability to ease cognitive perception in order to improve the 
veracity and quality of decisions. Henceforth, the most critical link in the DSS system is 
the communication link between the user and the DWM, or the user interface. 
C. THE USER INTERFACE 
The link between the user and the DSS is critical to the successful employment of 
the DSS. The interaction between the user and the DSS is bi-directional: it includes user 
inputs and requests, and the DSS return and display of the requested data. According to 
Sauter (2010), “to the decision maker, the user interface is the DSS” (p. 215). Turban and 
Aronson (1998) defined the user interface as “the hardware and software that facilitates 
communication and interaction between the user and the computer…including the 
exchange of graphic, acoustic, and tactile communication” (p. 229). Furthermore, Turban 
and Aronson (1998) stated that the user interface could be thought of as “a surface (lens) 
through which data is exchanged between user and computer” (p. 229). 
The full capabilities of the DSS are limited by the link between the DSS and user. 
Sauter (2010) endorsed the importance of the user interface and stated: 
It does not matter how well the system performs; if the decision-maker 
cannot access models and data and peruse results, invoke assistance, share 
results, or in some other way interact with the system, then the system 
cannot provide decision support. In fact, if the interface does not meet 
their needs and expectations, decision-makers often will abandon use of 
the system entirely regardless of its modeling power or data availability. 
(p. 215) 
Furthermore, Bennett (1986), states that the “quality of the interface…depends on 
what the user sees (or senses), what the user must know in order to understand what is 
sensed, and what actions the user can (or must) take to obtain needed results” (p. 355). In 
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order to build a user’s situation awareness, the user must know that a situation exists. 
Sensors that are linked to, or trigger the presence of, objects on the DSS, notify the user 
that a situation exists requiring their attention. 
The interaction between the user and the DSS through the user interface is based 
on the mirrored exchange of data between the user and the user interface, and the user 
interface and the computer. The cyclical process of a user interacting with the DSS is 
illustrated in Figure 8 (Bennett, 1986). In this illustration the link between the DSS and 
the user (the user interface) is depicted. The processing power and capabilities of the 
computer are limited by the speed in which the user can orient and interpret the data that 
is presented by the DSS.
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Figure 8.  The Two Sides of the User Interface (from Bennett, 1998, p. 355)
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The cyclical nature of the decision-making process occurs rapidly as the user 
interacts with the DSS through the user interface. Turban and Aronson (1998) defined 
this process as follows: “Displayed data provide a context for interaction and give cues 
for action by the user. The user formulates a response and takes an action. Data then 
passes back to the computer through the interface” (p. 230). According to Turban and 
Aronson (1998), the interactive process between the user and the system is depicted in 
Figure 9, and consists of the following components (Turban & Aronson, 1998, p. 230): 
• “Knowledge: The information the user must have to communicate with the 
computer” 
• “Dialog: An observable series of interchanges or interactions between the 
user and computer” 
• “Action language: A user’s action language can take various forms, 
ranging from selecting an item from the menu (with a keystroke or mouse 
click), to answering a question, moving a display window, or typing in a 
command. Input devices are used to execute actions” 
• “Computer: The computer interprets the user’s action (input), executes a 
task (such as computation or data access), and generates a display (the 
presentation language or the output of the computer)” 
• “Presentation language:  The information displayed to the users via output 
devices. Such information can be shown as display menus, windows, or 
text. It can be static or dynamic, numeric, or symbolic. It can appear 
visually on the monitor, presented as voice or a printout” 
• “User’s reaction: The user interprets the display, processes the content, 
and plans an action” 
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Figure 9.  Schematic View of the User Interface System (from Turban & 
Aronson, 1998, p. 87) 
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Bennett (1986, p. 357) argued that a designer’s goals in achieving a successful 
user interface are based on the following dimensions: 
• “Learnability: A specified level of user performance is obtained by a 
required percentage of a sample of intended users within some specified 
time from beginning of user training” 
• Throughput: The successful interaction by the user to quickly interact and 
acquire relevant information from the system. 
• “Flexibility: For a range of environments, users can adapt the system to a 
new style of interaction as they change in skill or as the environment 
changes” 
• “Attitude: Once the user has used the system, they want to continue to use 
it, and they find ways to expand their personal productivity through 
system use” 
Developing a user interface that is easy to learn, minimizes errors, is flexible in scope, 
and is appealing to users, will greatly enhance the success of, and ease operational 
resistance toward the acceptance of the DSS. 
The goal of a successful user interface is one in which Salter (2010) stated, “is a 
system that minimizes the barrier between human’s cognitive model of what they want to 
accomplish, and the computer’s understanding of the user’s information requests” (p. 
216). However, this interaction is limited because either the human, or the computer, may 
have a more accurate picture of the dynamic environment. In order to overcome the 
difference in the user’s CWM and the computer’s DWM, the DSS must be made fully 
aware of changes in mission phases and resultant states. Furthermore, the DSS must have 
the capability to discern if the user’s queries are based upon a sub-optimal CWM of the 
dynamic environment and stream the DSS’s most current SA. Therefore there is a 
requirement for two streams that are interacting to baseline the SA of the DSS (computer 
and user). These two streams, depicted in Figure 10, and compose the Human Computer 
Interface (HCI) Dataflow, are made up of the user’s information requests and the KB 
response, and the streaming SA from the KB. The baseline of the CWM and the DWM 
becomes a prerequisite necessary for the users to avail themselves of the full potential of 
the system. 
Ensuring that both the decision-maker and the DWM are operating at the same 
contextual mission state is paramount in providing the rapid acquisition of SA. Removing 
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states of confusion regarding the baseline of SA will increase the velocity and veracity of 
decisions. Salter (2010) stated that the “prime concern is the speed at which decision-
makers can glean available information from the system,” or more importantly, the 
highest quality of relevant information from the system. (p. 216). The user’s rapid 
cognition of the highest quality of relevant information from the system is what Salter 
(2010) describes as “exploiting the pre-attentive processing” of the user (p.216).  
According to Salter (2010), pre-attentive processing is the user’s ability to “recognize 
some attributes quite quickly, long before the rest of the brain is aware that is has 
perceived information” (p. 216).  This supports what Bennett (1986) refers to as 
“learnability, throughput, and attitude” (p. 357). Further concerns facing the decision-
maker include the time required to attain, the highest quality of relevant information and 
the confidence that the decision-maker has with their given level of situation awareness 
given a time constraint.  This entails linking the decision-maker to the most timely and 
relevant information that is of acceptable quality on which to base a decision.
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Figure 10.  Human Computer Interface Dataflow
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D. THE GRAPHICAL USER INTERFACE 
An effective user interface is one in which the user interface can efficiently 
translate the action language of the user to the computer. An inability to clearly articulate 
a user information request (action language) to the computer will result in an inaccurate 
or irrelevant return (display language) by the computer. This breakdown of 
communication is indicative of a disparity between the situation awareness of the user 
and DWM, and can lead to a loss of trust and confidence in the DSS. Once the computer 
understands the user information request, it can complete the interaction by presenting 
the relevant data for the user to base a decision in a concise and easy to interpret display. 
According to Salter (2010), an effective user interface “makes information quickly 
apparent…and allows users to focus on the data and the models in a way that supports the 
decision” (p. 216). An effective method of DSS user input interaction, which minimizes 
interpretation errors and is easy to use, is through the use of a graphical user interface 
(GUI). 
Given that time, and the commander’s response time, is a constrained resource in 
a given operation, the more effectively and efficiently that a commander can orient and 
interact with the DSS is critical. If an operational commander is in a situation in a 
dynamic, constantly changing environment, as the situation unfolds, so does the mission 
context. Therefore, as events occur, the situation awareness of the user, and/or the DWM 
may be deficient. Therefore, the bi-directional interaction between the user and the DWM 
must build situation awareness as quickly as possible. The quicker that the decision-
maker can effectively and efficiently interact and build the SA of the DSS as a whole 
(user and DWM), the decision-maker will be more apt to make a higher quality decision. 
Figure 11 demonstrates a graphical representation of this concept. 
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Figure 11.  Interaction between the Digital and Cognitive World Models 
A GUI, according to Turban and Aronson (1998), is an interactive user-friendly 
interface in which, by “manipulating objects, usually represented as icons (or symbols),” 
the user can interact with the computer” (p. 232). The GUI, according to Galitz (2007), is 
a method of user interaction with the DSS, in which the user utilizes an input device 
(mouse, microphone, touchpad), to interact with “elements referred to as objects…that 
are used to perform tasks such as pointing, selecting, and manipulating” (p. 15). The tasks 
performed by the user mimics physical reality, and can be easily translated into actions 
that the computer needs to perform. In other words, error and latency can by mitigated as 
the DWM more accurately represents the PWM. 
A GUI increases user efficiency in the interaction with the DSS. According to 
Shneiderman (1982), stated that the benefit of a direct manipulation of the interface, or 
user interaction with the DWM, is based on the “visibility of the object of interest, rapid 
reversible actions, and replacement of complex command language syntax by direct 
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manipulation of the object of interest” (p. 246). According to Galitz (2007, p. 18), the 
advantages and disadvantages of a graphical user interface are: 
Advantages 
• Symbols recognized faster than text 
• Faster learning 
• Faster use and problem solving 
• Easier remembering 
• More natural 
• Exploits visual/spatial cues 
• Fosters more concrete thinking 
• Provides context 
• Fewer errors 
• Increased feeling of control 
• Immediate feedback 
• Predictable system responses 
• Easily reversible actions 
• Less anxiety concerning use 
• More attractive 
• May consume less space on the display medium 
• Replaces national language 
• Easily augmented with text displays 
• Low typing requirements 
• Smooth transition from command language system 
Disadvantages 
• Greater design complexity 
• Learning still necessary 
• Lack of experimentally-derived design guidelines 
• Inconsistencies in techniques and terminology 
• Working domain is the present 
• Not always familiar 
• Human comprehension limitations 
• Window manipulation requirements 
• Production limitations 
• Inefficient for touch typists 
• Not always the preferred style of interaction 
• Not always the fastest style of interaction 
• Increased chances of clutter and confusion 
• May consume more screen space 
• Hardware limitations 
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A well-designed GUI should be intuitively understood by the user in order to 
more quickly and efficiently translate user requirements into action language. According 
to Mingxia, Qichun, and Qi (2004), an effective GUI can replace the “complex and 
confusing syntactic and semantic language required to search through complex, multi-
database environments” (p. 24). The utility of a well-designed GUI and user training, is 
in the ability of the user to proceed through their half of the DSS-user interaction yielding 
more actionable knowledge quicker. By narrowing the gap between the CWM and 
DWM, a user can attain the actionable information to base a decision quicker, or 
complete additional iterations until the desired level of situation awareness is achieved in 
a given period of time. Henceforth, the decision-maker can proceed through their 
cognitive decision-making cycle more rapidly. 
E. GRAPHICAL VISUALIZATION 
After the user interacts with the computer, and translates their information 
requests into action language, the computer can begin processing the information 
requests. The first iteration of the cyclical process is complete when the computer returns 
results via the display language. This can be in the form of a visual display on the display 
medium (monitor, mobile device, projection), a printout, or audible return. The ability of 
the user to quickly orient and process the graphic visualization will enable subsequent 
decision iterations to happen in a shorter amount of time. Furthermore, if higher degrees 
of understanding are attained from the visualization (Information, Knowledge, Wisdom), 
the frequency of reliance on the DSS to build an SOP will be minimized, since the 
decision-maker has the required level of knowledge to make a decision. 
According to Galitz (2007) “visualization is the cognitive process that allows 
people to understand information that is difficult to perceive, because it is either too 
voluminous or too abstract” (p. 24). The goal of the visualization is to present user 
information requests in a manner that facilitates the rapid cognitive ingestion of wisdom 
from knowledge. This will enable the decision-maker to perform valuable analytics 
quickly on the visually presented data. Galitz (2007) stated: 
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The goal of a visualization is not to reproduce a realistic graphical image, 
but to produce one that conveys the most relevant information. Effective 
visualizations can facilitate mental insights, increase productivity, and 
foster faster and more accurate use of data. (p. 24) 
Furthermore, Sauter (2010) stated that a DSS (especially in an unstructured 
problem environment) “can facilitate intuition” by providing the decision-maker with the 
capabilities to know more than just the “results of an analytic model” (p. 48). Sauter 
(2010) stated that “presentation tools, such as graphs and charts, can ensure decision-
makers grasp the full implications of their data…and see patterns among phenomena they 
might not otherwise notice” (p. 48). In order to provide anomalous detection, it is 
paramount that the DSS is capable of “illuminating trends, patterns, or anomalies, which 
are apparent only in graphical representations of the data” (p. 48). 
A successful graphic visualization will quickly translate the meaning of the data 
to the user. Rather than just providing quantitative returns, the visualization of the DWM 
illicit user anomalous detection based on pattern identification. This allows quicker 
understanding of underlying themes, translation of data into information, and 
identification of decision implications on the status quo. 
F. INFORMATION VISUALIZATION VERSUS KNOWLEDGE 
VISUALIZATION 
In order to maximize the utility of a DSS, the user must efficiently interact with 
the system and quickly glean information from the computer’s returns. Minimizing input 
errors can be accomplished through the direct manipulation of a GUI. However, this is 
only half of the interaction. In order to be able to quickly glean actionable information 
from the system, the user must be able to quickly orient and interpret presented 
visualizations. 
The use of visualizations in a DSS can be grouped into the distinct categories of 
Information Visualization (IV) and Knowledge Visualization (KV). According to Frank 
and Drosodof (2005) IV is the “collecting of data, documentation of abstract database 
data…automatic visualization of big data masses and large quantities of information” (p. 
365). IV is a topical presentation of data that lacks depth of introspection into underlying 
 73 
themes and patterns. According to Burkhard (2004), KV “is more than facts and graphs, 
its goal is an enabling technology allowing the correct conveyance and application of 
complex insights, experiences, perspectives, and high level concepts from one entity to 
another” (as cited in Hanratty, 2009, p. 3). 
The optimal presentation for a DSS in a dynamic environment, requiring digital 
interoperability, is a KV. By presenting a user with an IV, the DSS is limiting the 
capabilities of the user. A KV will allow for a decision-maker’s better understanding of 
the underlying themes behind the represented data. User’s cognition of underlying 
variable interrelationships through a KV will grant the user an increased understanding 
than from the topical data visualizations presented in an IV. The user’s increased 
cognitive state, or higher degree of situation awareness, will reduce the referential 
reliance on the DSS. 
The goal of KV is the efficient transfer of knowledge, not data. According to the 
DIKUW framework, KV attempts to transfer data or information into knowledge and 
understanding. According to Burkhard (2004), in order for the transfer of knowledge to 
be accomplished the following “difficulties need to be solved” (p. 1): 
• “Information Depth: Tradeoff between an overview and details that need 
to be communicated.” 
• “Limited Time: Limited time, attention, and capacity of the recipients.” 
• “Different Background: Different cognitive backgrounds and difficulties 
of decision-makers to understand the novel information visualization 
tools.” 
• “Relevance: Providing the relevant information to different stakeholders.” 
Despite the broad scope of data that needs to be encompassed in order to compete the 
successful transfer of knowledge, the KV needs to be focused to prevent common 
problems. These problems, according to Burkhard (2004, p. 1) are: 
• Knowledge Overload: Decision-makers are not efficient in identifying 
relevant information. 
• Misuse: Decision-makers cannot use or misuse the information for 
decision-making, or the knowledge presented is insufficient for the given 
level of uncertainty that exists in the dynamic environment. 
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The art of a KV design is being able to translate knowledge, through the user 
interaction, while minimizing the aforementioned pitfalls. If successful the KV will 
enable the user to understand, via cognitive perception, displayed information and 
knowledge quicker and more effectively. By transitioning to predictive and prescriptive 
recommendations, the KV will effectively minimize uncertainty, and the unknown, in 
order to maximize confidence in generated COA. The quicker data processing capability 
of the user will enable a more rapid progression through the user’s decision-making 
cycle. Furthermore, the user will progress to higher levels of the DIKUW framework and 
reach higher states of dynamic unstructured environment understanding. According to 
Roth (2006) the seamless integration and sublimation of the DSS and the user is referred 
to as hyper-beings. Ultimately the higher understanding granted by the rapid translation 
of knowledge to the user will gain them a competitive advantage. 
G. VISUALIZATION AND ANALYTICS 
The use of visualizations will enable the decision-maker to gain deeper insight 
into raw data. This will allow a deeper understanding of underlying algorithmic models 
and decision variables that drive different outcomes. By reaching a deeper understanding 
of relationships that support a data model, the decision-maker will become less 
reactionary to the raw data. The overall goal of the visualization is to display the 
integrated data in mission’s situation context managed by the knowledge base (KB). KB 
information and knowledge is stored in generated descriptive, predictive, and prescriptive 
layers by inference and other AI techniques. Commercial DSSs are transitioning toward 
predictive analytics, while the United States Marine Corps is focused on the use of 
visualizations that support descriptive analytics. Without overcoming the inertia that 
resists technological change, the United States Marine Corps will lack the competitive 
advantage that visualizations that support predictive analytics can provide. 
H. DSS SOLUTIONS 
1. Introduction to OLAP Cube and OLAP Cube as an Integration Layer 
As defined by the OLAP Council (1997), OLAP is a data integration model that 
allows users to analyze integrated data via fast, consistent, interactive access to numerous 
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views of information. OLAP supports workflows and dataflows starting from raw data to 
reflect multidimensionality and individual dimension’s hierarchical relationships. Colliat 
(1996) further adds that OLAP service tools provide analysis methods for databases. 
These analysis methods possess historical, current, and projected summary data 
characteristics at the most basic level. Additional analysis features include multiple level 
interactive navigation, derivative data views from raw data, multidimensional views, near 
instantaneous gap analysis, and large datasets (up to 500 Gigabytes). Colliat’s (1996) 
research also proves that multidimensional database representations provide significant 
advantages to relational database formats with respect to used storage space, speed of 
retrieval, and derivative calculation speed with less investment of time achieving better 
results with more capable query analysis. 
The OLAP cube provides an extraordinary opportunity to support transparency in 
a SOP. Data integration and data fusion reduces the data saturation of the decision-maker 
and enables rapid building of a SOP, provided the data is handled with appropriate 
information aggregation techniques by leveraging OLAP dimension hierarchies. OLAP 
data model presents an optimal environment for the DWM to extract the necessary 
knowledge through the exploitation of the OLAP cube and is a good foundation for 
analytical modeling. 
Figure 12 depicts the OLAP data cube concept and the functionality it implies for 
the decision-maker to extract pertinent data from the source cube. The source cube is the 
data warehouse or master data repository, organized for faster data access, containing all 
available data views. The smaller cubes or segments are disseminated to the decision-
maker by knowing what is pertinent to him/her. Possessing only the relevant data reduces 
network bandwidth requirements while improving latency in query retrieval. It also 
enables traceable origins, or provenance, of the analytics and confirms the derivation of 
the source of data for the decision-maker, which is paramount to securing a competitive 
advantage. A greater understanding of the pedigree of data generates trustworthiness 
within the decision-maker regarding the data’s authenticity and integrity.
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Figure 12.  OLAP Source Cube Propagation Model
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The OLAP cube architecture is valuable as a metadata management layer for 
incorporation into the proposed model for DSS and knowledge view management. The 
user at any hierarchical echelon level including the tactical edge dissects the master cube 
depicted in Figure 12 further, utilizing intuitive navigation query techniques to negotiate 
the meta-data. This allows the user at the tactical edge to be operational in limited to zero 
bandwidth scenarios. Decision-makers interactively execute the OLAP Cube 
aggregation/summarization operators over the data views. This concept is presented in 
Figure 13. The decision-maker is enabled manipulation over the cube layers with slice-
and-dice, roll-up, or drill-down actions on the meta-data to exploit the cube model 
looking for the pertinent data at his/her decision making command level. 
The decision-maker can then utilize prior views already located within the data 
storage array to create derived views based on his selections provided to the 
aggregation/summarization operators. This architecture supports arrays that can contain 
any data type, except unstructured data. Such approaches make it possible for the 
decision-maker to extract the knowledge (captured in the views) as part of the HCI DSS 
exploitation process. Due to the unstructured data limitation unstructured text is 
interpreted and stored in the same venue as operational commands. The holistic view of 




Figure 13.  OLAP Cube as an Integration Layer 
2. OLAP Cube Use Cases 
a. Operational Statistical Analysis 
The Google Public Data Explorer (GPDE) utilizes the OLAP data cube to 
visualize published statistical data (W3C, 2013). The specific language utilized for the 
visualization and exploration of the statistical data is the Dataset Publishing Language 
(DSPL), which combines the tabular number and text data in comma-separated value 
(CSV) files, the data schema, and XML files (W3C, 2013). This particular use case 
demonstrates great relevance for military use of the OLAP Cube architecture based on 
comprehensible visual depictions and ease of data exploration of the graphical 
visualizations. Unit logistical statistics and readiness rates compared over user-selected 
ranges would enable commanders to comprehend the situation with the appropriate 
visualization model that most closely reflects the DWM. The OLAP Cube architecture 
allows for the data to be hierarchically organized and then the user the opportunity for 
drill-up and drill-down as appropriate. 
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b. Sensor Integration and Analysis 
Another OLAP Cube architecture use case with attributes beneficial for the 
decision-maker involves aggregating raw sensor data. Typically this data is published on 
the Web and visualized inside a webpage. Environmental data is of particular interest to 
military commanders, measured via autonomous sensors and assimilated into XML files 
on the Web and integrated and displayed together. From this data, with aid from the 
digital assistant available through the DSS, the user can manipulate the meta-data within 
the OLAP Cube in order to create a visual representation of the data. Through further 
manipulation of the stored data the user can adjust the visual representation as well as 
create new representations by combining other views or creating brand new views. 
Presentations of the queried data ranges from complex to simple depending on the 
application attribute selections of the user or the cognitive capability of the decision-
maker based on inputs from the cognitive assistant. 
3. Non-cloud Based 
A technique for incorporating text-rich type documents into searchable database 
architectures is the Contextualized Data Warehouse Architecture (CDWA). This is an 
interim step, developed in parallel with ongoing tactical data cloud efforts in the Navy 
and Marine Corps utilizing OLAP Cube and the Relevance Cube (R-cube) data 
warehousing technologies. The contextualized data warehouse architecture structure is a 
non-cloud-based decision support system that combines structured data and unstructured 
text-rich documents into usable information by analyzing integrated data under context 
(Perez, Berlanga, Aramuru, & Pedersen, 2005). The analysis of both structured and 
unstructured data is valuable to the commander. Figure 14 depicts the flow of structured 
and unstructured data in parallel, emphasizing the extraction of contextualized facts from 
text documentation and combining this information with structured data from an OLAP 
tool, providing robust analysis of all information resources for the decision-maker that is 
easily assimilated into an information system for display to the commander. 
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Figure 14.  Contextualized Warehouse Architecture (from Perez et al., 2005) 
The foundation of the contextualized data warehouse architecture, as depicted in 
Figure 14, contains the main components of the traditional structured data warehouse, 
represented as the Corporate Warehouse, and a document warehouse, able to evaluate 
designed information retrieval conditions. Additionally depicted are the fact extractor 
module and the OLAP component, which feed data into the relevance cube (R-cube). 
This architecture better supports the text-rich data inherent with intelligence reports by 
extracting the pertinent data elements from the documentation based on dimensional 
inputs providing context for extrapolation. The focused inputs are derived from the 
essential information requirements, such as CCIRs, established by the decision-maker. 
Perez et al. (2005) developed a technique that combines the structured data of 
relational or multidimensional databases, easily analyzed via OLAP tools, with 
unstructured data from rich text documents, where information extraction techniques 
identify facts from the document with relevance to the key word searches. This type of 
data architecture allows decision-makers to incorporate unstructured data thoroughly into 
their decision-making processes. The analysis is performed by an R-cube, which is 
 81 
characterized by the two dimensions of relevance and context (Perez et al., 2005). Perez 
et al. (2005) define these two dimensions as the numeric value relevance, which measures 
the importance of each extracted data fact in context with the analysis, and the context 
relating the facts to the documents explaining the facts circumstances. 
A user supplies a sequence of key words for the search, such as ISIS critical 
vulnerabilities, which is analyzed for relevance against the text-rich data pulled from the 
document warehouse via the fact extractor. The information is analyzed with the R-cube, 
and segments of the text-rich documents are provided based on a relevance value with 
regard to the context of the search keywords (Perez et al., 2007). The R-cube analyzes 
only the text-rich data available via the fact extractor algorithms to locate pertinent 
information to the user in a condensed format, displaying only relevant lines of analysis 
improving the timeliness of a Commander’s decision-making process. 
These data warehousing models provide robust capabilities for social network 
analysts’ keyword searches sifting through vast amounts of data without any real analysis 
capability and are ideal for the text-rich XML and JSON documents, but are neither the 
software solutions, nor architecture of choice for the current Tactical Cloud Reference 
Implementation (TCRI). The main reason for TCRI not incorporating Contextualized 
Data Warehouse is because the TCRI database is based on Accumulo NoSQL data store. 
Dimension definitions of the Contextualized Data Warehouse are not a direction 
currently pursued by TCRI generalized schemas, as TCRI’s emphasis is currently to 
support Semantic Web Standards based on OWL/RDFS technologies. Those standards 
don’t follow multi-dimensional school of thinking as Data Warehouse do. The latter is 
based on OLAP data model, while the former is not. There are novel efforts to include 
OLAP data cubes into the Hadoop ecosystem. However, those efforts are focused on 
integration with Hadoop Distributed File System (HDFS) without any integration with 
Accumulo-based Knowledge Stores based on OWL/RDF. 
4. Cloud Based 
The Apache Software Foundation (2015) distributes Apache Hadoop, open-source 
software framework solutions, for distributed computing that is reliable and scalable. The 
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software is capable of analyzing large data sets and distributing over thousands of 
machines within a cluster. Data storage is controlled by the Hadoop Distributed File 
System (HDFS) and data processing is accomplished with Hadoop MapReduce. An 
additional software package building on the HDFS, with easier user interface and greater 
speed, is Apache Berkeley Data Analytics Stack (BDAS). BDAS is an open source 
software stack that integrates software components that are active contributors for 
developing the framework of machine learning (ML). 
ML provides other key attributes for big data processing, such as dimensionality 
reduction and decision trees. Via ML techniques variables are eliminated from 
consideration based on redundancy or irrelevancy improving performance. For example, 
in kinetic attack planning scenarios, time and location may be critical operational factors, 
however, in non-kinetic scenarios, such as cyber warfare, physical location may be 
irrelevant. Decision trees are useful ML method for evaluating multiple COAs through 
maximization of expected outcomes. Another ML technique is combinatorial 
optimization, including simple random sampling and heuristic and statistics-based 
approaches, allowing software algorithms to group similar COA and find the 
operationally best alternative (Schrijver, 2002). 
Similar to Hadoop MapReduce, Spark is a ML framework that utilizes an 
improved application program interface (API) based on a resilient distributed data (RDD) 
set container that supports lineage and provenance. The interaction of Spark with other 
Hadoop tools for interactive queries, large-scale graph processing, and real-time analysis, 
enables processing and querying of big data (Apache, 2015). Novel approaches utilizing 
Apache Spark in cloud architecture, enables analysis of COA decisions based on OLAP 
Cube risk mitigation techniques. By leveraging the ML, Spark provides the capability of 
dynamically creating rules adapting quickly to changing environments and scenarios.  
Additional Apache software, such as Spark Streaming (Apache, 2015), provides real-time 
updates based on micro-batch processing, sampling incoming data by small time 
windows or batches, while sacrificing some latency for efficiency and resiliency. The key 
to success is selecting the appropriate algorithms for the different operational, 
intelligence, and logistics data type combinations and the requested outputs. 
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I. CURRENT DSS EXAMPLES 
Many commercial DSS exist that help commercial organizations yield a 
competitive advantage. For example, United Parcel Service (UPS) employs a DSS 
referred to as ORION (On Road Integrated Optimization and Navigation). This DSS 
provides visualizations that enable predictive analytics for UPS logistics support. Since 
the inception of ORION, UPS has had a reduction in 85 million miles driven, 8 million 
gallons of fuel purchased, and 85,000 metric tons of carbon dioxide released into the 
environment (UPS loves logistics…and analytics, n.d.). Furthermore, these reductions 
have translated into a reduction in operational costs, which have been translated into 
customer value as UPS accomplishes their mission more efficiently (UPS loves 
logistics…and analytics, n.d.). 
Aside from UPS, the financial sector has also adopted DSS that provide 
visualizations and predictive analytics. From a decision-maker’s perspective, Burg (2015) 
stated that “financial services companies have decreased the time to decision time by 
13%...utilizing analytics to aid in the decision making in areas of risk, fraud mitigation, 
liquidity, and collateral management” (paragraph 8.). 
Though UPS and the financial sector have experienced the benefits of a predictive 
and prescriptive DSS, the United States military services have yet to incorporate such 
systems. The task of incorporating such a DSS into the military organization will be very 
challenging because the DoD maintains such a wide variety of Big Data. The current 
hierarchal architecture of the DOD has caused a hierarchal organization of physical and 
data workflows. Due to the hierarchal nature of the DOD, this is an inevitable reality. 
Until the physical and data workflows can transcend this architecture, the full benefits of 
a prescriptive or predictive DSS will be unattainable. Achieving this level of data 
integration will take a vast investment of time and work. Both UPS and the financial 
sector have achieved these benefits relatively quickly. The DOD will have a harder time 
achieving these benefits because the mission scope UPS and the financial sector is more 
focused. The battlefield commander requires integrated physical and data workflows that 
encompass the entire DOD and their associated entity mission scopes. 
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J. SUMMARY 
A decision-maker is subject to the limitations of their cognitive capabilities while 
trying to maintain situational awareness in a dynamic environment. Whether in garrison 
or on the tactical edge of combat, a myriad of sensors are collecting a mass of data that 
the decision-maker is unable to process and comprehend. A decision support system 
provides the decision-maker with an interactive tool that enables them to have a higher 
degree of SA of the dynamic environment in which they operate. 
As the design and functionality of DSS components are improved, and data across 
the organization becomes increasingly integrated; the gap between the decision-maker’s 
CWM and the PWM, decreases. As this gap decreases, the decision-maker is able to 
orient himself/herself to the environment with increased veracity and velocity. This 
heightened SA, which is more accurate, yields higher quality decisions. 
Enabling the rapid building of a decision-maker’s SA is dependent upon linking 
the DSS to the most accurate and relevant data. Visualizations based on OLAP cube 
integration, provide the opportunity for the decision-maker to rapidly glean knowledge 
from the DSS. Utilizing visualizations based on OLAP cube integrated data will build the 
situation context that is managed by the DSS knowledge base. As the KB increases, the 
DSS will transform from a system that is descriptive, to one that is predictive, and 
ultimately prescriptive system. The greatest benefit, and competitive advantage, is 
achieved from an organization that embraces a prescriptive DSS based on an integrated 
data source.  
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V. ANALYSIS 
The United States Marine Corps has a storied history of being able to adapt to the 
environment, overcome adversity, and rapidly manipulate procedures to contend with 
unforeseen environmental challenges and novel belligerents in order to accomplish the 
given mission. However, the Marine Corps’ success does not directly correlate to the 
achievement of effective and efficient mission execution. Often the organizational 
structure of the service is a hindrance to efficiency. Sometimes effectiveness in mission 
execution is deterred by information degradation and lateness in the doctrinal reporting 
structure. The concept of merging process and data workflows, performing data analysis, 
and overcoming the traditional hierarchal reporting architecture of the Marine Corps, will 
create greater transparency, effectiveness, and efficiency for the organization. 
Information is essential to the efficient execution of mission orders in combat. 
Information is derived from FFIRs and PIRs, which stem from a decision-maker and the 
SA inherent within the commander or appropriated from the support systems. Two major 
utilities derive the effectiveness and efficiency of the C2ISR and Logistics support 
functions within the military service: workflow and dataflow provenances. The former is 
a function of organizational structure and military processes (TTPs, SOPs, etc.) and the 
latter is a function of authoritative source data granularity within the architecture. 
A. USMC ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 
1. As-is Hierarchical Structure 
The hierarchal structure of the Marine Corps is susceptible to the construct of 
organizational silos. This hierarchal structure benefits the Marine Corps Commander 
based on the relative ease of control and manageability; however, it imposes limits upon 
achieving integrated organizational efficiencies and effectiveness. The hierarchal 
structure of a Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), the basic building structure of the 
Marine Corps, is depicted in Figure 15. 
The top of the organization is the command element (CE), which is composed of 
the MAGTF Commander and the headquarters staff. The primary elements that make up 
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the MEF are the aviation combat element (ACE), ground combat element (GCE), and the 
combat service support element (CSSE). The aviation element contains all aviation assets 
and the supporting structure. The GCE contains the ground forces, mechanized and non-
mechanized, which are available to the MAGTF Commander for combat operations. The 
primary infantry unit of the GCE ranges from a division to a battalion based upon the 
mission of the MEF. The infantry units are based on the four-man fire team, three of 
which make up a squad. The rule of threes continues up through the organizational 
structure of the platoon, company, and battalion. The CSSE handles the logistics 
functions of the MEF and is responsible for supporting both the ACE and the GCE. 
During combat, and while in garrison, higher headquarters dictates an overriding 
mission objective to subordinate units along with a Commander’s Intent, or more 
generally, a desired end state. This command philosophy allows the subordinate 
commanders to decide how to achieve their portion of the mission. The principal mission 
objective focuses the individual units on achieving short-term goals, without regard to 
surrounding unit’s tribulations, often to the detriment of attaining organizational 
effectiveness and efficiencies. In pursuit of parallel objectives, a commander splits his or 
her forces requiring a very high level of SA to maintain the mission context. 
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Figure 15.  Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) Organizational Structure 
(from MCDP 3, 1998) 
The organizational limitations imposed by the hierarchal stovepipes of this 
structure create near-sightedness or the individual entities toward their portion of the 
overall mission only. Most units do not comprehend the complete impact their individual 
efforts have throughout the organization and on the overall ethos. The Commander’s 
attentions are focused on the individual process workflows that the unit must embody in 
order to achieve unit effectiveness; this structural linchpin, fashioned by doctrine, inhibits 
integrated process and data workflows throughout the larger organization. This 
concerning dilemma is readily apparent in the current construct of CCIRs, both FFIRs 
and PIRs. 
Each individual unit commander formulates CCIRs in order to act as notification 
triggers to environmental changes and commander expectations during the execution of 
the operation to attempt to keep the commander’s SA within a given confidence level. 
Upon notification of a CCIR, the commander orients cognitively to the situation, and 
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makes the necessary decisions based on the available information and their understanding 
of the given dilemma. This type of system process is highly reactionary; the commander 
receives the notification, achieves some semblance of SA, and reacts to the situation 
accordingly. In order to achieve a higher degree of efficiency and effectiveness in 
command and control, an integrated information system needs to be created. 
The CSSE is responsible for handling the logistics functions of the entire 
organization and the workflows associated with the CSSE are integrated heavily with the 
workflows of the ACE and GCE. As the ACE and GCE use resources, a demand signal is 
sent to the CSSE to replenish those supplies. Maintaining a heavy surplus of supply is not 
an ideal situation for military forces forward deployed in austere environments. The 
synergy of resource replenishment and utilization is preserved based on the dataflow 
between the ACE and GCE units with the CSSE. When specific thresholds, encoded into 
rules, are triggered; the CCIR notifies the commander prompting them to make decisions. 
The informational transference architecture of a MEF is depicted in Figure 16. 
FFIRs and PIRs act as an iterative feedback loop between the decision-maker and the 
dynamic environment in which they operate. A commander formulates a decision and 
issues an order. If the given situation progresses in a manner other than anticipated, a 
CCIR is triggered, in the ideal system, in order to notify the commander; and thus 
complete the feedback loop. If the commander is unable, or only partially able, to address 




Figure 16.  MEF Hierarchical Command Structure with Non-integrated Feedback Loops (As-is) (after MCDP 3, 1998)
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Often, subordinate CCIRs are based upon CCIRs formulated from higher 
headquarters. Therefore, what a higher commander deems important, becomes a CCIR 
for a subsequent commander, limiting the agility of subordinate commanders to 
proactively adjust CCIRs based on their units given environment. The construct of FFIRs 
and PIRs are limited to the SA of the superior decision-maker. Therefore, the level of SA 
of the superior commander has cascading effects on the subordinate echelon SA and the 
organizational SOP. The hierarchal structure of the MEF is therefore an information 
architecture based upon a pyramid of feedback loops, FFIRs, or PIRs. Reports, in 
response to FFIRs and PIRs, forward information up the chain of command as a situation 
evolves, while new orders ripple back down the chain of command as higher echelons of 
command make the required adjustments. Due to this organizational hierarchy, error 
and/or information latency is introduced into the decision-making system at each level of 
the hierarchy. 
The error and/or latency introduced into the feedback system can have cascading 
effects on the higher echelon decision-maker. Each hierarchal level has the potential to 
introduce additional error or latency on the information based upon the lens of 
interpretation, therefore affecting the overall SA and SOP of the organization. In order to 
yield increased operational agility, and competitive advantage, the flow of information 
needs to change. Instead of processing information linearly throughout the hierarchical 
organization structure, a concurrent dataflow, needs to be in place. This concurrent 
dataflow translates priority information (FFIRs and PIRs) instantaneously throughout the 
organization. The linearity of reporting is removed and lateral information sharing is 
achieved. This type of informational architecture would resemble a matrix of information 
sharing nodes all inter-connected and autonomous, vice a hierarchal organizational 
structure as depicted by Figure 16. 
2. To-be Integrated Matrix Structure 
The ideal data sharing organizational structure is described as a matrix comprised 
of interconnected and autonomous nodes integrating data from every sensor, to every 
node, and to respective decision-makers in a matrix of interconnectivity as depicted in 
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Figure 17. By using the OLAP data model for achieving an organizational SOP, SA is 
integrated laterally and vertically throughout the hierarchal command structure. Linking 
the data to the decision-maker (D2D) minimizes error induction and latency, and 
therefore increases the overall efficiency and SA of the organization participants. The 
interconnectivity increases transparency of organizational decisions and strategy. A 
matrix of integrated information workflows will yield many benefits to the commander. 
However, the increased volume of information to the tactical edge easily leads to 
information overload at the sub-commander level.
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Figure 17.  MEF Hierarchical Command Structure with Integrated Decision Points (To-be)
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Veracity of information and velocity of quality decisions will yield the 
commander a competitive advantage. Commands that are lower on the MEF command 
hierarchy have higher velocity of decision cycles than superior echelon commands. This 
will ensure that over time, after the performance of analysis on the dataflows, the holistic 
organization becomes more efficient and effective in day-to-day operations. In the 
Marine Corps these benefits may be unattainable, as this type of organizational change 
will be faced with active and passive resistance due to cultural inertia and organizational 
bias. Straying from the traditional means of information sharing to a more transparent 
integrated information matrix threaten commander’s occupational status and job security. 
Increased availability of sensor data, via transparent access, may produce negative 
impacts on the control a decision-maker possesses. Transparency of the information 
management is a powerful tool for leaders to exercise control over subordinates. In order 
to shape the situation senior commanders might find a necessity to withhold certain 
information from a subordinate in an effort to manipulate actions and achieve a particular 
outcome. While difficult to understand the utility of this practice, the matrix 
organizational structure would eliminate the ability to manipulate available information 
based on a superior commander’s bias. 
In another instance, a subordinate commander might find it beneficial to withhold 
information from the superior commander. The matrix structure provides the superior 
commander tools to see through those efforts. Therefore, a subordinate commander 
withholding information contradicts the superior commander’s SA. For example, a 
subordinate commander’s after action report (AAR) might withhold information about a 
particular operation to alleviate scrutiny from the commanding officer. However, in a 
matrix structure, the commanding officer receives ammunition, supply replenishment, 
and intelligence reports recounting the overall operation. Analysis of these reports 
utilizing transparency shows inconsistencies in all operations, preventing malicious 
under-reporting. 
Decision-makers must be willing to overcome the inertia that resists change 
within the organization and enable leaders to become change agents. Commanders must 
demolish the traditional hierarchical structure and break down the barriers of status, rank, 
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and position in order to achieve greater subordinate aptitude. Despite the past successes 
of utilizing the hierarchical structure, the proposed matrix represents a model to capture 
inconsistencies. This increases the effectiveness and efficiency of the organizational 
planning by enhancing the knowledge base and SOP of the command hierarchy. Despite 
proposed organizational changes, the commander maintains the authority and 
responsibility of command. 
B. ACHIEVING THE MATRIX 
In order to achieve the matrix, the formal and informal cross-domain process 
workflows need to be documented. Once documented, these workflows can be analyzed 
and synthesized in order to determine the critical path(s) of dataflow. These synthesized 
data paths dictate the data that needs to flow from respective sensors to an appropriate 
decision point. The synthesized data paths link authoritative, un-altered data from the 
sensors to appropriate decision-makers. This alleviates the latency and potential for bias 
at each decision point within a hierarchical system flow. 
1. Coarse-Grain Provenance 
The most general approach to data flow, recording historical data sets, the human 
process interface, program interaction tracking, and sensor collection, is using analysis of 
the workflow coarse-grain provenance to derive the data fine-grain provenance. This 
form or provenance requires capturing the steps taken to achieve derivations, recording 
human interactions throughout the process(es), and tracking of external devices such as 
sensors, cameras, and other data collecting equipment (Islam, 2010). More specifically, 
coarse-grain provenance involves linking the decision-maker, or analyst, to the source 
data and illustrating how derived data has been calculated from raw observations (Islam, 
2010). According to Islam (2010) a system records data sets from input, the tools used for 
processing, and the sequence of application steps during analysis. Ideally, workflow 
provenance allows users to find executable workflow process steps for each data item, 
but this causes complications for large data sets and requires additional techniques for 
querying data flow provenance. 
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2. Fine-Grain Provenance 
Linking decision-makers directly to the source data will require the 
“authentication, integrity, and trustworthiness of the information (Islam, 2010, p. 1). 
According to Islam (2010), this type of authentication is known as “data provenance” 
(Islam, 2010, p. 1). Since the contents of databases are typically derived from other data 
sources such as the combination of other databases and/or user created data integration, 
provenance data describing creation, recording, ownership, processing, and version 
history is essential for judging quality and integrity of the data (Islam, 2010). Curated 
databases are created due to copying data from external sources or due to updating, 
inserting, or deleting data from the local database. The tracking of these actions is crucial 
in maintaining the provenance of data and can be done with the addition of a provenance 
store database and a local modification database. There must be a bi-directional feedback 
from the fine-grain dataflow into the coarse-grain workflow in order to achieve optimal 
states of data provenance. 
C. MERGING WORKFLOWS 
Step one in achieving an integrated information matrix is to document the 
physical process workflows of the organization. Once documented, the process 
workflows can be analyzed in order to determine where workflow merges would benefit 
the system. A workflow merge is defined as the process of combining one workflow 
schema into another, removing redundancies, and keeping all necessary steps to ensure 
context (Sun, Kumar, & Yen, 2006). After the formal and informal workflows are 
documented, a systemic approach is undertaken to eliminate redundant steps. A workflow 
merge is depicted in Figure 18. In this case, the workflows of Company A and Company 
B are merged; eliminating the redundancies (create order, create delivery), and necessary 
steps are retained (check credit, check availability, check payment, check stock). 
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Figure 18.  Complex Merge Scenario (from Sun, Kumar, & Yen, 2006) 
When merging workflows, the first step is identifying merge points (Sun, Kumar, 
&Yen, 2006). Figure 18 depicts merge points identified as create order and create 
delivery. After the workflows are merged the result offers many benefits to the 
organization. These benefits include increased throughput, reliability, flexibility, and 
quality (Sun, Kumar, &Yen, 2006). Furthermore, the systematic approach and modeling 
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of workflows allow the organization to perform simulations on newly designed 
workflows in order to achieve even higher states of effectiveness and efficiency. 
The systematic modeling of the process workflows will identify areas where 
parallel functional areas possess merge points. However, parallel processes may have 
workflows that lend themselves to different types of merges. According to Sun, Kumar, 
and Yen (2006), there are four different types of merges, which combine workflows into 
more complex structured workflows (p. 854–855): 
• “Concatenate, insert, replace: Two workflows are merged by 
concatenation or insertion, or a structured workflow is replaced by another 
structured workflow, resulting a change in the base workflow.” 
• “Parallel merge: Two structured workflows are combined in parallel using 
AND-SPLIT and AND-JOIN, resulting in process steps conducted in 
parallel by resulting in the same workflow outcome.” 
• “Conditional merge: Two structured workflows are combined in parallel 
using OR-SPLIT and OR-JOIN, resulting in a more efficient workflow.” 
• “Iterative merge: Variation of a conditional merge in which the OR-JOIN 
occurs first and it is followed by a matching OR-SPLIT.  Since the 
original workflows are structures, the resultant workflow is also 
structured.” 
D. DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEM 
In order to properly track and record provenance data, a data store (DS) must be 
created that ingests all layers of meta-data and data. Each meta-data entity is associated 
with each data occurrence within the DS. Meta-data and data ingested into the DS keeps 
organizational dataflows separated. Therefore meta-data and data views collected from 
C2, ISR, and Logistics workflows, need to be kept separate in order to maintain a high 
degree of fine-grain dataflow provenance. If this data from separate authoritative sources 
is allowed to migrate into a shared database structure, the source is no longer attributed as 
an authoritative source any longer. In addition, the authoritative sources granularity could 
be reduced. Once this data is ingested, it will be necessary to disseminate and manage the 
dataflow provenance. Due to the large amount of data that will be ingested, a policy 
reflecting the amount of dataflow provenance, and history, should be promulgated to 
minimize data store size. 
 98 
Depicted in Figure 19, information is then extracted from the separate DSs and 
integrated into a single KB. Located within the KB there are staging and OLAP-friendly 
views for processing. The fusion engine operates over the staging views and generates 
fused views. These views are transformable by the users by applying OLAP 
aggregation/summarization operators as part of user decision-making activities during the 
OLAP Cube exploitation. Figure 19 represents ideal data integration scenario for the 
decision-maker describing end-to-end dataflow from the authoritative data sources 
directly to the user to realize D2D. The visualizations of the DSS analyze and interpret 
patterns or anomalies to increase the decision maker’s perception. Additionally, 
predictive what-if scenarios are possible further improving the interactivity of the HCI. 
Once this architectural data model is constructed, it can be built into a decision 
support system. Using knowledge visualizations, dataflows are linked to formal and 
informal workflows executed decision-makers. Feeding authoritative data sources into 
the appropriate fusion decision points overcomes the inefficiencies of the decision points 
of the command hierarchal structure. The proposed matrix enables D2D by yielding 
workflow and dataflow provenance efficiencies resulting in a superior degree of D2D.
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Figure 19.  Data Integration
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E. THE COGNITIVE MODEL OF THE MATRIX 
Once in use, data can be collected and analyzed to identify focal points for 
increased efficiencies. Islam (2010) referred to this as fine-grain analysis or dataflow 
provenance, which is the information describing how data has moved through a network 
of databases. After enough provenance data has been collected, the DWM can be 
elevated from empirical and diagnostic, to a DWM with predictive and prescriptive 
capabilities. As depicted in Figure 20, the DWM gains cognitive power by composing 
elementary ideas into composite ideas that aid the decision-maker. 
Adding cognitive capabilities to the DWM results in a DSS that visualizes the 
interpreted sensor information. The DWM is also in the position to prescribe its own 
FFIRs and PIRs organically, as well as alerting the decision-maker operating the DSS 




Figure 20.  Cognitive Model of the Matrix (after “Concussions Accelerate Cognitive Decline,” 2012)
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F. CONCLUSIONS 
This research and analysis offers several conclusions regarding knowledge 
visualization techniques, which achieve optimized operational decision making and data 
integration, particularly with regard to information requirements, flow, and lineage. 
Chapter three analyzes and breaks down the information requirements necessary 
for thorough COA analysis and selection for decision-makers taking into account risk 
analysis. Examination of the current doctrine and lessons learned from recent experiences 
lead to the compilation of the appropriate information requirements for operations, 
intelligence, and logistics functions of warfare planning and execution. Future IS 
applications requirements must ensure these and future determined information requests 
are included in the data query techniques. 
The analysis establishes the importance of a matrix type organizational structure 
for informational flow. All nodes within the matrix must possess the ability to 
communicate with every other node within the matrix to ensure a common shared 
operation picture (SOP). This type of organizational structure ensures that the 
information relevant for decision-makers is available with limited latency and error 
induction. Eliminating the high number of decision points of the current (as-is) USMC 
hierarchal command structure of acquiring SA mitigates inefficiencies. Determining the 
critical paths for dataflow ensures that the required data reaches the appropriate 
automated and manual modes. Therefore, our research significantly contributes to the 
D2D challenge. This architecture is leveraged on ensuring coarse-grain workflow and 
fine-grain dataflow provenance. Increasing the veracity and velocity of information 
provides the decision-maker with a competitive advantage over the adversary, placing the 
commander within the OODA loop of the opposition. 
The research found that a HCI dataflow model, taking advantage of the dataflow 
between the DWM and CWM, increases SA by improving understanding and wisdom. 
Those models interact by sharing conceptual relationships between the knowledge base, 
digital assistant, and cognitive assistant. The overall goal of enhanced SA based on the 
SOP is achievable by developing architectures based around the suggested dataflow 
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model. In order to achieve the to-be integrated matrix, the SOP needs to be based on a 
sharable data model. The research, due to the ability to support command and other 
hierarchies, identified that this shareable data model requires OLAP cube data modeling. 
The proposed data integration model ensures that authoritative sources of data 
from C2, ISR, and Logistics dataflows are kept separate to ensure dataflow provenance. 
Maintaining separate ingests into independent data stores ensures authenticity. Then the 
dataflow is assimilated into a single knowledge base where the fusion decision points 
create user transformable views from staging views within the knowledge base. This 
concept limits the hierarchal decision points and maximizes workflow and dataflow 
provenance minimizing the potential for errors and latency. 
G. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
During the course of research and analysis several opportunities surfaced that are 
ideal for future explorations of these topics, but were left out due to the scope and time 
constraints of this project. These opportunities are outlined below. 
The information requirements conceptualized through this research were based 
upon service specific dogma and lessons learned documentation, which often becomes 
doctrine. Deeper analysis is achievable through interview discovery of previous MAGTF 
Commanding Officers and their staffs in order to drill down further into the decision 
maker’s information requirements for assessment and selection of COA alternatives. 
Incorporating commonalities of interviews or survey answers provides correlation 
analysis opportunities. These types of interviews and surveys create value for upgrades 
within the information collection algorithms of future system upgrades. 
Additionally, organizational culture and psychological safety analysis of the 
baseline Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) is a beneficial analysis tool to determine how 
and where the MEU hierarchical structure must deemphasize status and rank to ensure 
success. Within the Marine Corps, the hierarchical structure, rank, and status of position 
mean a great deal with regard to authority and responsibility. Determining the probability 
of breaking down these barriers of hierarchical status is important in establishing 
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opportunities for future success in creating the to-be matrix of information organizational 
sharing proposed within the research. 
Future research is also recommended to identify workflow merge points across 
the warfighting domains of the ACE, GCE, and CSSE. Incorporating mergers of the 
process workflows at these points ensures the integration of C2ISR and Logistics 
functions. Integration of workflows helps decision-makers gain insights into optimizing 
processes, leading to increases in throughput, reductions in supply stockpiles, and 
ultimately increasing the value-chain across the warfighting domains. 
Lastly, designing an application prototype of the to-be integrated matrix is the 
next, essential, step towards implementation of the proposed design.  Follow on 
developmental testing of the prototypes is essential for satisfying the requirements 
analysis of the IS. This developmental testing conducted in coordination with operational 
evaluation testing of Marine Expeditionary Units provides operators with the ideal 
environment for critical analysis of the system’s capabilities and limitations. Further 
analysis of the application prototype limitations by decision-makers leads to the 
generation of creative solutions for future DSS software versions. 
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